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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis presents an analysis of Edmund Burke's 
place in intellectual history by examining his commentary 
on the French Revolution as well as his role in the 
Enlightenment itself.  In doing so, it brings to bear the 
previously unexplored ideas of the twentieth-century 
historian Roy Porter.  The thesis proposes that Burke's 
indictment of French philosophy as the cause of the French 
Revolution created enduring historiographic connotations 
between radicalism and the notion of enlightenment.  
Consequently, British thinkers of the eighteenth-century 
were invariably dismissed as conservative or reactionary 
and therefore unworthy to be regarded as enlightened 
figures.  Porter's reconsideration of the British 
Enlightenment reveals Burke to be a staunch defender of 
hard-won enlightened values which British society had 
already long enjoyed. 
 The source material is, for the most part, primary.  
For Edmund Burke, his correspondence and his Reflections on 
the Revolution in France.  For Roy Porter, his most 
relevant essays, journal articles and monographs. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In the 1790s many British intellectuals, political 
figures and common citizens presumed that the ideas 
underpinning the French Revolution were noble and 
irresistible.  Revolutionary fervour, it was felt, would 
inevitably (and for some, rightly) cross the Channel and 
refashion English politics and society as it had in France. 
 Britain's experience with revolution and the 
enthusiasms which it provoked was already richly developed 
by the time of enlightenment.  The seventeenth-century 
Civil Wars and Glorious Revolution had established England 
as a country where monarchs and governments might be ruined 
by religious dissension, incompatible political 
philosophies, and the ongoing death throes of feudalism.  
Yet despite the egalitarian orders newly born in America 
and France, by the century's end revolution had come to 
nothing in England. 
 This thesis is tripartite in structure.  It first 
discusses Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, the earliest intellectual reaction to and critique 
of the French Revolution and its causes.  Burke's analysis 
of the Revolution is presented, as is his indictment of 
those philosophes who, he believed, inspired it. 
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 Secondly, the thesis offers a modern evaluation of 
Burke's appraisal of revolution and its historiographic 
place in the British Enlightenment by Roy Porter.  A 
historian of ideas, Porter argued that Burke overemphasized 
the connection between the philosophes and the French 
Revolution.  This contributed to an enduringly negative 
perception of the Enlightenment, and reinforced the 
historical view of England as a nation untouched by it. 
 Finally, this thesis presents Porter's explanation of 
how the British Enlightenment was conservative in nature on 
account of its defense of previously attained rights and 
freedoms.  Britain's pragmatism insulated it from 
instability, but the Burkean conflation of radicalism with 
"true" enlightenment pigeonholed Britain's intellectual 
contributions as being reactionary. 
 This approach is novel and somewhat unusual in that it 
attempts to restore Britain's place at the fore of 
enlightenment by demonstrating how the conservatism of its 
thinkers (i.e., Edmund Burke) was an attempt to protect an 
already enlightened social and political order.  
Ultimately, the success of this conservatism blinded 
historians from recognizing the important role the British 
Enlightenment played in creating the modern world.  Porter 
was the first scholar to identify this historiographical 
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lacuna and the first who attempted to reestablish British 
thinkers as the legitimate parents of the Enlightenment. 
 Burke was born in Dublin, Ireland in 1729 to a 
Catholic mother and a Protestant father who was a solicitor 
by profession, and a member of the Church of Ireland by 
faith.  After graduating from Trinity College in 1748, he 
emigrated to London with the intention of studying law, but 
abandoned the field, and instead occupied himself as an 
essayist (writing noteworthy tracts on anarchism and 
aesthetics) and publisher (co-founding the political 
journal Annual Register with bookseller Robert Dodsley).  
His resulting political connections afforded him the 
opportunity to serve as private secretary for Whig Member 
of Parliament Charles Watson-Wentworth, Marquess of 
Rockingham — then Prime Minister. 
 From 1765 onward, Burke himself sat as an M.P. in the 
Commons, invariably on behalf of pocket boroughs dominated 
by Rockingham and his allies.  Throughout the 1760s and 
1770s he established his reputation as a proponent of 
parliamentary rights, as a vigorous critic of the East 
India Company (he was the driving force behind the 
impeachment of Warren Hastings, Indian governor-general), 
and as an advocate for Irish — often Catholic — causes. 
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 Interestingly, Burke was also a steadfast champion of 
the rebellious American colonials, on the grounds that the 
English Crown had abrogated its traditional obligations to 
its subjects in the New World.  His eloquent Commons floor 
defenses of the 1776 revolutionaries were topics of great 
debate and went some ways to upending Lord North's 
embattled Tory administration.  Burke was then appointed 
Paymaster of the Forces during Rockingham's brief thirteen-
week return to power, holding the office until the end of 
North's and Charles James Fox's Tory-Whig coalition in 
1783.  Burke remained an opposition back-bencher until his 
retirement in 1794, but the controversial success and 
renown of his Reflections on the Revolution in France 
(1790) resulted in his near total alienation within the 
pro-Revolution Whig ranks.  He died of stomach cancer at 
his Beaconsfield estate in 1797. 
 Burke is described habitually as a father of political 
conservatism, but if he was by turns an enemy and ally of 
revolution, we are left to wonder at the underlying nature 
of his political philosophy and his place within the 
intellectual context of his own age.  What, in fact, made 
the French Revolution so anathema to Burke's principles 
that he was motivated to compose his justifiably famous 
analysis?  What were his impressions of the "systems of 
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thinking", rights of man, and abstract ruminations which 
came to characterize the Enlightenment of which he was 
part? 
 As a historian, interpreter, and critic of the 
Enlightenment, Burke was its spectator, yet he was equally 
a coal in its fires, as representative of its nature as his 
contemporaries, Immanuel Kant or Voltaire.  In similar 
fashion, his Reflections on the Revolution in France were 
at once his current report on the Revolution's dangers and 
a disclosure of its perpetrators but also a document 
revealing his own place in the history of enlightened 
ideas. 
 Burke set himself the charge of unmasking the true 
culprits who he believed had fomented the French 
Revolution:  the philosophes.  If these writers and 
thinkers had had the power to ignite anarchic revolt and 
inspire projects of strange social engineering, then there 
could be, he surmised, a correspondingly formidable 
antidote in good counsel.  This he attempted to provide in 
his Reflections with all the powers of articulation he 
could muster. 
 In doing so, Burke is revealed to be a sort of 
philosophe in his own right.  For his attacks on 
enlightened systems of thinking were rooted in an 
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intellectual appeal to history.  To his mind, England had 
already run the gauntlet of "inspired" violence in the 
English Civil Wars, much of it salted with radical, 
irrational philosophy.  The ancient traditions of Crown and 
Parliament had persevered and their validity was 
reaffirmed, rendering England prosperous, free, and stable.  
Yet within radical French philosophy he detected a pseudo-
religious zeal which was finding agreement with the 
political sensibilities of England's liberal Dissenters.  
In Burke's estimation, the greatest threat to Britain's 
hard-earned order was therefore a man like Joseph Priestley 
(1730-1804) who was in equal parts a revolutionary 
sympathizer, an intellectual, and a clergyman — and might 
directly or inadvertently resurrect the civil strife which 
had scarred England's seventeenth-century. 
 Roy Porter, in contrast, was two centuries removed 
from these anxieties, but could claim the benefit of all 
the intervening scholarship on Burke and his world.  Porter 
was, in many respects, the Enlightenment's most sublime 
analyst, meticulous in his research, expansive and eclectic 
in his subject matter and ideas. 
 Born in London in 1946, he was the son of a middle 
class jeweller.  A life-long insomniac, he married five 
times, and between 1962 and the time of his death from 
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cardiac arrest in 2002, Porter authored, contributed to, or 
edited some 493 scholarly works, wrote over 600 reviews, 
and appeared in countless television presentations.  His 
range of historical enquiry spanned the field from art to 
geology, medicine to literature, psychiatry to agriculture, 
economics to botany, chemistry to urban planning — and with 
each he endeavored to reveal their relationship to the 
history of Western thought. 
 In 1964 Porter entered Christ's College at Cambridge 
to study English, but instead pursued History.  After 
noticing the relative paucity of work dedicated to British 
ideas in the Enlightenment, he composed his doctoral thesis 
"The Making of Geology in Britain, 1660-1815" under the 
noted David Hume scholar, Duncan Forbes.  In 1972 Porter 
was appointed Fellow and Director of Studies in History at 
Churchill College, and then two years later assistant 
lecturer, eventually rising to the rank of Dean.  While at 
Churchill, he cut a notably unconventional figure, due in 
large part to his scruffy denim-and-chains appearance, his 
manic enthusiasm for his ever-changing researches, and his 
uncontainable energy.  At one point in the mid-seventies, 
Porter could lecture twenty-five hours per week, perform 
administrative duties and still manage to direct a campus 
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production of Richard Sheridan's The Rivals (starring 
future author Douglas Adams). 
 In 1979, two years after the publication of his first 
book, The Making of Geology, Porter joined the Wellcome 
Institute for the History of Medicine in London, where he 
remained until his death.  Throughout the 1980s he was a 
fixture on the BBC and served as a policy advisor on AIDS 
initiatives to the British government. 
 Porter's work reveals his conviction that different 
cultures and countries had fostered different species of 
enlightenment, each with their own priorities, impediments, 
and influences.  He had gone so far as to edit, with 
Mikulas Teich, a collection of essays on the subject, The 
Enlightenment in National Context.  England, of course, was 
Porter's primary field of interest, and he explained what 
he believed to be its characteristics in the Age of Reason.  
Unlike the French, the English had little use for abstract 
sophistry.  They were practical and pragmatic.  The English 
were more interested, he contended, in preserving what they 
had already gained, and were obsessed with improving 
everything else.  The Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, as explained in Porter's canon, was a prime example 
of this form of British conservatism defending enlightened 
values in spite of itself. 
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 Porter proceeded to argue on behalf of the British 
intellectuals of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-centuries 
who, along with their achievements, had been relegated to 
relative obscurity by historians entranced solely by 
Continental thinkers.  The French Revolution and its 
alleged prelude in Parisian salons, he mused, had come to 
dominate the history of the Enlightenment far too much.  
Was Burke in part responsible for this overemphasis on 
French events and philosophy?  Was he correct in naming the 
philosophes as the Revolution's instigators?  For Porter, 
the answers lay not so much in a direct response to those 
particular questions, but rather in considering the actual 
legacy of enlightened French philosophy.  His conclusion, 
in part, was that the philosophes' greatest influence was 
not political, but rather social:  they had habituated 
continental Europeans to secularism. 
 Where Burke had been prescient was in identifying the 
French Revolution as a clash of intellectual principles, 
between pragmatic order and the Age of Reason's obsession 
with systems of thinking.  French intellectuals had pursued 
ideas for their own sake and the results had been the 
Revolution and the Terror.  The British Enlightenment had 
been functional and conservative, in Porter's estimation, 
and had consequently saved England from revolution, 
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allowing it to experience the fruits of that Enlightenment 
into the nineteenth-century, uninterrupted. 
 The English (whom, Porter noted, the French had 
emulated) forged a social order stable enough to carry out 
the reforms and improvements which precipitated the 
prosperity and democratization of later years.  It was 
individuals of "useful" natures such as Priestley (or in 
his own way, Burke) who had bequeathed to modernity 
whatever legacy was to be had from the Enlightenment; yet 
historians had not recognized it.  This ignorance, Porter 
noted with some chagrin, had begun with Burke's link 
between violent revolution and radical philosophy on the 
Continent. 
 Porter's most significant contribution to the history 
of ideas was that the Enlightenment was in great measure 
British, and that it did not necessarily culminate in a 
blood-drenched revolution.  Edmund Burke had argued 
otherwise in 1790, persuasively enough that his view became 
historiographical orthodoxy.  It was an irony, Porter 
revealed, that in doing so, many enlightened Britons were 
doomed to historical obscurity as reactionaries. 
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PART I 
 
 ”Whenever our neighbour’s house is on fire, it cannot 
be amiss for the engines to play a little on our own.  
Better to be despised for too anxious apprehensions, than 
ruined by too confident a security.”1  So said Edmund Burke 
in his Reflections on the Revolution in France.  In saying 
as much, he assumed the colossal task of defending a 
traditional order against what was viewed widely as a 
noble, progressive revolution, supremely moral in its aims.  
And, among polemicists, he did so largely alone.  Supremely 
confident in his own powers of political foresight (wrought 
from decades of experience as a Member of Parliament), 
Burke interpreted the Revolution in a different light, 
identifying it as a menace, shot through with immaturity 
and inhumanity.  The charge, therefore, was to reveal that 
malevolence, and unmask its roots and agents before they 
strangled the English Church and Crown. 
 While Burke monitored the daily political events in 
France — and was certainly concerned with the turmoil as it  
unfurled — throughout his writings he sought sedulously to 
identify the recondite, but no less dangerous, causes of 
the Revolution.  For surely, if these seeds had borne such 
apparently bitter fruit in Paris, similar ideas could take 
hold in London with equally frightening consequences. 
                     
1
 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, edited by Conor 
Cruise O’Brien (London:  Penguin Books, 1968), p. 92. 
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 Burke perceived two sets of intellectual vandals:  
first, the French philosophes who had sown and cultivated 
the subversive, and therefore unreasonable, notions in 
Gallic minds, and second, British political radicals, 
seduced by the Revolution, desiring a regicidal sequel in 
their own land.  To his great consternation, the main 
British suspects were Dissenters who had already attacked 
the Church of England on doctrinal grounds, and were 
forming philosophical societies to encourage democratic 
reform (or possibly rebellion).  The connection between 
theological and political radicalism was clear to Burke; 
just as French agitators had undermined the Catholic 
Church’s authority as a prelude to challenging the 
monarchy, in like fashion Dissenters had subverted 
Anglicanism before taking aim at the Crown. 
 Burke’s correspondence would indicate that he was not 
overly concerned by the early events of France’s 
Revolution.  The Bastille’s storming had been reported in 
London papers in late July 1789.  His first comment on the 
happenings, dated August 9, described the tumult as 
“mysterious”, and by November, he was as yet admitting that 
the complexity of the Revolution defied all manner of 
speculation.2  By the year’s end, he still did not sense 
that any revolutionary sympathies in Britain were serious 
                     
2
 Burke, “Letter to the Earl of Charlemont - August 9, 1789”; “Letter to 
Charles-Jean-Francois Depont - November 1789” in The Correspondence of 
Edmund Burke VI (July 1789-December 1791), edited by Alfred Cobban & 
Robert A. Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. xii, 
10, 41. 
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enough to merit close attention.  The troubles in France 
remained to him “a matter of curiosity,” as he wrote on 
December 17.3 
 By the end of 1789, Burke had essentially decided his 
opinion of the Revolution, but it was not until mid-January 
1790 that he came to feel an urgent need to offer a public 
counterpoint to its enthusiasts.  What had irked him most 
strongly were accounts of the November 4 proceedings of the 
Society for Commemorating the Revolution in Great Britain 
(founded 1788), in the Old Jewry, at a Dissenting meeting 
house.  The society had been formed in honour of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688.  Newspapers had published 
excerpts from a sermon delivered there by the eminent 
Dissenting clergyman, Rev. Richard Price [1723-91], 
entitled “Discourse on the Love of Our Country”.  The 
sermon was strongly in favour of France’s revolutionaries, 
and Burke felt impelled to contemplate its political 
ramifications in a deeper manner.4 
 To praise revolution in such a way, Burke believed, 
was little more than sedition, and required a 
countervailing argument of equal fervency.  “The dislike I 
feel to revolutions, the signals for which have so often 
been given from pulpits”, obliged him to direct Britons’ 
attentions back to the traditional principles of good 
                     
3
 Ibid., “Letter to Philip Francis - December 17, 1789”, pp. xii, 55. 
4
 Ibid., “Letter to Unknown Correspondent - January 1790”, p. 81; 
Reflections, pp. 91, 93. 
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government.  He wrote to a French acquaintance: 
 
We ought not, on either side of the water, to 
suffer ourselves to be imposed upon by the 
counterfeit wares which some persons, by a double 
fraud, export to you ... as raw commodities of 
British growth though wholly alien to our soil, 
in order afterward to smuggle them back again 
into this country manufactured after the newest 
Paris fashion of an improved liberty.5 
 Still, he remained somewhat baffled by English zeal 
for the French insurrection in the 1790s.  Despite their 
constant association of notions of liberty with political 
revolt, what indeed would it mean for Englishmen to 
surrender their realm to rigid, philosophical systems?: 
 
Is our Monarchy to be annihilated, with all the 
laws, all the tribunals, and all the antient 
corporations of the Kingdom?  Is every land-mark 
of the country to be done away in favour of a 
geometrical and arithmetical constitution?6 
 While it was one thing for such ideas to be proffered 
in philosophical societies, Burke was troubled that his own 
political party, the Whigs, might be steadily infiltrated 
by radicals such as the Rev. Price or his more prominent 
Dissenter colleague, Dr. Joseph Priestley [1733-1804].  
Already, many Whigs were inclined to adopt the Revolution 
Society’s Jacobin principles as an unofficial creed of the 
Party.  By mid-1791, Burke’s opposition to the Society had 
rendered him fairly isolated and unpopular within the ranks 
of the Whigs, as its leader, Charles James Fox, had both 
                     
5
 Burke, Reflections, p. 110. 
6
 Ibid., pp. 144, 145. 
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publicly and privately denounced the Reflections while 
simultaneously praising Price and the Revolution.7 
 For his own part, Burke did not consider himself an 
enemy of the rights of man.  They were necessary, and good, 
and worthy of protection, but unlike his opponents, he 
considered them to function only as a type of higher, 
Platonic ideal; “... their abstract perfection is their 
practical defect.  By having a right to every thing [men] 
want every thing.”  Insistence on absolute political rights 
raised the possibility that such goals would remove the 
mediating influence of compromise from the traditional 
relations between governments and kings — and those mutual 
obligations were the traditional form of rights which Burke 
was willing to defend.8 
 He traced such systems of thinking directly to the 
philosophes of the eighteenth-century, many of whom he had 
read at length.  Though he often denounced them as a 
species, Burke reserved special enmity for a few select 
thinkers whose ideas he held to be particularly liable for 
the outbreak of revolt.  It was not a blind indictment; he 
scrutinized them individually, and some, such as Charles 
Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), he outright 
admired. 
 Indeed, it has been argued that Burke’s own rhetorical 
                     
7
 Burke, “Letter to Earl Fitzwilliam - June 5, 1791” in The 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke VI, pp. 273-274. 
8
 Burke, Reflections, p. 151. 
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style was greatly indebted to Montesquieu, primarily in his 
use of strongly historical explanations for great social 
problems.  This, however, was not a method Burke pursued in 
questioning the Revolution.  To examine France’s past for 
causes of the present troubles might indicate 
justifications for them.9  Moreover, he felt that it was 
typical of philosophes to abuse history for tendentious 
purposes, exploiting selective criminal incidents in the 
French clergy’s past to encourage reaction against the 
Church in the present.10 
 Montesquieu had not merely been an admirer of 
Britain’s constitutional arrangements, but had recognized 
that a great monarch could comprehend the complexity of his 
society, and in accordance act politically.  Later French 
thinkers, Burke maintained, did not grasp this, and debased 
politics with fixed notions of democracy, “reduc[ing] men 
to loose counters merely for the sake of simple telling. 
... The elements of their own metaphysics might have taught 
them better lessons.”11 
 Despite what some alleged, Montesquieu’s works 
conformed the least to the principles of French radicals.  
In January 1790 Burke noted to an unidentified 
correspondent,  
 
 
                     
9
 C.P. Courtney.  Montesquieu and Burke (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell & Mott 
Ltd., 1963), pp. 148-149. 
10
 Burke, Reflections, p. 246. 
11
 Ibid., p. 300. 
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You say, my dear sir, that they read Montesquieu 
- I believe not.  If they do, they do not 
understand him.  He is often obscure; sometimes 
misled by system; but, on the whole, a learned, 
and ingenious writer, and sometimes a most 
profound thinker.  Sure it is, that they have not 
followed him in any one thing they have done.  
Had he lived at this time, he would certainly be 
among the fugitives from France.12 
 
 The insidious thinkers were Voltaire (1694-1778) and 
especially Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), for they were 
not merely political rebels but social engineers.  Voltaire 
was essentially a mischief-maker “who had the merit of 
writing agreeably; and nobody has ever united blasphemy and 
obscenity so happily together.”13  Nonetheless, that 
blasphemous tone had served to eliminate the omnipotence of 
God, and Burke believed it was calculated to shunt aside 
the Catholic Church, leaving no legitimate authority in its 
place:  “Their object is, that their fellow citizens may be 
under the dominion of no awe, but that of their Committee 
of Research, and of [the philosophes’] lanterne.”14 
 Rousseau was talented and perfidious in equal measure.  
Burke could speak somewhat authoritatively about him, as he 
may in fact have met him in 1766 when both visited the home 
of their mutual friend David Hume.  Burke summarized 
Rousseau as “not a little deranged in his intellects, to my 
                     
12
 Burke, “Letter to Unknown Correspondent - January 1790”, The 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke VI, p. 81. 
13
 Ibid., p. 81. 
14
 Edmund Burke, Letter to a Member of the National Assembly in The 
Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke Vol VIII, edited by L.G. Mitchell 
(Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 319. 
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almost certain knowledge.  But he saw things in bold and 
uncommon lights.”  His public opinion of his writings had 
long been dubitable.  Burke had written scathing reviews of 
both the Letter to d’Alembert and Emile for the Annual 
Register, but while the Social Contract had seemingly not 
attracted his attention, in 1790 he saw it as culpable and 
dangerous: 
 
Little did I conceive that it could ever make 
revolutions, and Law to nations.  But so it is.  
I see some people here are willing that we should 
become their scholars too, and reform our state 
on the French model.  They have begun and it is 
high time for those who wish to preserve morem 
majorum to look about them.15 
 Burke’s most famous public denunciation of Rousseau 
was in the pages devoted to the Swiss philosopher's 
thinking in the dense jeremiad, Letter to a Member of the 
National Assembly; it had been composed upon the French 
assembly’s announcement of erecting a statue of Rousseau.  
Interestingly, mere days before the Letter was to be 
published in January 1791, an anonymous pamphlet was 
circulated, A Comparison of the Opinions of Mr. Burke and 
Monsr Rousseau, alleging that the two had much in common 
regarding constitutional reform.  Burke, it seems, was 
unmoved.16  No one but Rousseau had been such an inspiration 
for the Revolution, and the new government in Paris was now 
populated by his clones.  From Burke’s Letter: 
                     
15
 Burke, “Letter to Unknown Correspondent - January 1790”, The 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke VI, p. 81. 
16
 Ibid., “Letter to Unknown Correspondent - January 26, 1791”, p. 214. 
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Him they study; him they meditate; him they turn 
over in all the time they can spare from the 
laborious mischief of the day ... Rousseau is 
their canon of holy writ.17 
Burke, having observed him at hand, considered Rousseau a 
charlatan, driven and consumed by vanity rather than 
principle, but in practical terms his desire for attention 
meant social engineering.  “Under this philosophic 
instructor in the ethics of vanity, they have attempted in 
France a regeneration of the moral constitution of man.”  
Burke continued, “I am certain that the writings of 
Rousseau lead directly to this kind of shameful evil.”18 
 If Rousseau had been successful on the continent it 
was due to the fact that Europeans had not paid proper heed 
to the classical authors of antiquity, as had Montesquieu.  
Instead, they hungered for — and found in him — novel ideas 
for their own sake.19  Burke recounted that Rousseau had 
told Hume that the secret to winning minds was to find a 
substitute for that of classical myth, which in an 
enlightened age, no longer entranced European minds.  Fresh 
ideas had been called for amongst men, Burke noted 
ruefully, “Giving rise to new and unlooked for strokes in 
politics and morals.”20 
 On the page, the systems and social theories of 
                     
17
 Burke, Letter to a Member of the Nation Assembly, in The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke, p. 312. 
18
 Ibid., p. 312. 
19
 Ibid. p. 312. 
20
 Burke, Reflections, pp. 283-284. 
 20 
philosophes were mere intellectual conceit, but when their 
application infected the workings of a state, such ideas 
were both ludicrous and impractical in civic life:  “I hope 
that handy abridgements of the excellent sermons of 
Voltaire, d’Alembert, Diderot, and Helvétius ... are sent 
down to the soldiers along with their civic oaths.”  That 
politics had become so invasive in France was painfully 
amusing to Burke, who had learned that her soldiers were 
being “supplied with the ammunition of pamphlets as of 
cartridges.”21 
 If such novel, doctrinaire systems of thinking were 
being introduced, the traditional restraints of civic 
conduct were being lost: 
 
It is a revolt of innovation, and thereby the 
very elements of society have been confounded and 
dissipated. ... But I have observed that the 
philosophers in order to insinuate their polluted 
atheism into young minds, systematically flatter 
all their passions natural and unnatural, they 
explode or render odious or contemptible that 
class of virtues which restrain the appetite.22 
It was, consequently, the philosophes’ disciples who would 
be the generation about whom Burke counseled vigilance: 
“The men who to day snatch the worst criminals from 
justice, will murder the most innocent persons to morrow.”23 
 This type of all-encompassing political philosophy was 
peculiarly French, Burke observed.  Unlike British 
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thinkers, France’s were motivated to destroy established 
thinking simply because it was traditional, and not because 
of its relative worth: “They think that government may vary 
like models of dress, and with as little ill effect.”24 
 English philosophers, in contrast, did not seek 
recourse to abstract rights and pure rationality which, 
Burke insisted, could paralyze men morally and politically.  
“Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding 
general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the 
latent wisdom which prevails in them.”25  Thus far, in 
British history, Burke believed that Englishmen were not 
yet contaminated by French ideas: 
 
We are not the converts of Rousseau, we are not 
the disciples of Voltaire, Helvétius has made no 
progress amongst us. ... We think that no 
discoveries are to be made, in morality; nor many 
in the great principles of government, nor in the 
ideas of liberty.26 
That said, Burke admitted that the English had had their 
fair share of Freethinkers and Dissenters, but their 
ultimate influence upon the local political culture had 
been negligible, and they certainly had not worked as a 
conspiring group in the French fashion: 
 
Who, born within the last forty years, has read 
one word of Collins, and Toland, and Tindal, and 
Chubb, and Morgan, and that whole race who called 
themselves Freethinkers?  Who now reads 
Bolingbroke?  Who ever read him through? ... They 
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never acted in corps, nor were known as a faction 
in the state, nor presumed to influence ... our 
public concerns.27 
The attacks on the French Crown and Church had been led by 
a new sort of men anyhow, a caste of “political men of 
letters” he called them.  Previously, during the reign of 
Louis XIV, they had been cultivated at court, but in the 
wake of the seventeenth-century, had formed an entirely 
different body, with their own interests, at odds with 
tradition.  Though Burke pointed to the Académies as being 
a locus of their activity, he believed more firmly that the 
Encyclopédie was the true epitome of their aims; their 
goal, he thought, was attention by means of redefining the 
nuclei of human reference.  To Burke this made them a sort 
of literary cabal, fanatics in proselytizing their anti-
ecclesiastical dogma, and their projects, over time, had 
truly altered French thinking about society.  They had 
developed, he asserted, a monopoly on literature and ideas 
in France, denouncing and sanctioning any who dared 
disagree.  While he acknowledged that some amongst them had 
suffered persecution, Burke described it as intermittent, 
and for all that, hardly harsh enough to silence to them.28 
 Throughout the eighteenth-century, the philosophes had 
endeavoured, quite blatantly, to undermine Europe’s 
traditional monarchies and social orders.  Note, Burke 
mused, how the philosophers had insinuated themselves into 
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relationships with princes (e.g., Frederick the Great), 
flattering despots, while at the same advocating public 
revolt against property laws and the clergy.29 
 To the end of his life, he was quite convinced that 
the philosophes had been engaged in a genuine conspiracy, 
chiefly against Catholic authority.  In May 1797, mere 
months before Burke’s death from stomach cancer, the French 
priest, Abbé Augustin de Barruel [1741-1820], had sent him 
a manuscript of his new work on Jacobins, Mémoires pour 
servir à l’histoire du Jacobinisme.  It listed Denis 
Diderot and Thomas Paine, amongst others, as “principal 
conspirators” of the radicalism.  Burke replied 
affirmatively, stating “So far back as the year 1773,” the 
year of his visit to France, “they were busy in the plot 
you have so well described. ... To this I can speak as a 
witness.”30 
 The philosophers’ success in achieving a revolution 
was borne, on one hand by undeniable literary talent, and 
on another, by calculating cleverly a palatable message for 
willing and distinct audiences.  Burke brooded, 
 
Writers, especially when they act in a body, and 
with one direction, have great influence on the 
publick mind. ... They became a sort of 
demagogues.  They served as a link to unite, in 
favour of one object, obnoxious wealth to 
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restless and desperate poverty.31 
Burke contended that in this connection he had ascertained 
why the assault on the clergy and the confiscation of their 
church lands had been so fervent.  It was a union of 
interests between atheistic writers and the monied 
commoners whom they had inspired: 
 
As these two kinds of men appear principal 
leaders in all the late transactions, their 
junction and politics will serve to account, not 
upon any principles of Law or of policy, but as a 
cause, for the general fury with which all the 
landed property of ecclesiastical corporations 
has been attacked.32 
 Though the English had not contrived such radical 
notions, in the wake of France’s evidently successful 
Revolution the philosophes’ “multitude of writings” was 
being 
 
dispersed with incredible assiduity and expence. 
... and in England, we find those who stretch out 
their arms to them, who recommend their examples 
.. and who choose, in more than one periodical 
meeting, publickly to correspond with them, to 
applaud them, and to hold them up as objects for 
imitation.33 
 As much as Edmund Burke despised the intellectual 
insubordination of the French, his more pressing fear was 
that the English, in the 1790s, would begin promoting like-
minded radicalism in Britain.  At no time did he feel the 
Revolutionaries to be great in number, and though they were 
hardly inconspicuous, they were not representative of the 
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country’s political mood.  Rather, they were “loud and 
troublesome insects of the hour,” whose influence could not 
be allowed to grow.34 
 The principal target of his remonstration was the 
Revolution Society, but more so in 1790-91, the Reverend 
Richard Price, who was its president in those years.35  Just 
prior to that the leader had been Charles, Earl of Stanhope 
(1753-1816), who had ensured the Society’s place on Burke’s 
enemies list, after sending congratulations to the French 
revolutionaries for seizing the Bastille, and then 
forwarding Price’s sermon to the National Assembly as 
further congratulations.36  This was borderline sedition to 
Burke, because as a public organization replete with 
prominent politicians and clergy, the Revolution Society 
had opened correspondence with the French assembly without 
the blessing of the Crown.37  It was this body which nearly 
alone motivated Burke to compose his Reflections, and as a 
counterweight to any other society who gave the French 
Revolution a “solemn public seal of sanction.”38 
 Despite Burke’s suspicion that the Society’s political 
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philosophy was forged in French ideals, they identified 
themselves more overtly with the British Enlightenment.  
Even if they might deny it through casuistry, Burke 
contended in the Reflections, the Society had an agenda 
which was set in defiance of the Crown.  He outlined three 
of their main, contrarian principles: 1) that citizens had 
inalienable rights to choose their leaders, 2) that 
citizens could dismiss leaders for misconduct, 3) that 
citizens could frame a government for themselves.  No 
matter what its members might argue, Burke regarded this as 
a Bill of Rights which did not exist in England, and 
indeed, something few Englishmen would desire.39 
 While the Society had been formed in honour of the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, Burke believed its members 
were woefully askew in their understanding of that event’s 
true nature.  They had instead conflated the ideals of 
Cromwell’s Revolution with recent events in France.  Had 
lawmakers in 1688 favoured an elected national assembly, 
they would have established one at the time.  They had 
instead chosen a king.40  The only reason for the Society’s 
willful misinterpretation was that they were, to a man, 
pro-Jacobin, and in a democracy, would undoubtedly “erect 
themselves into an electoral college” with great 
enthusiasm.41 
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 Burke was not an apologist for atavistic conceptions 
of Divine Rights of Monarchs such as “the old fanatics” had 
been in past times; they, he felt, were little different 
than “the new fanatics” who drafted panegyrics to populist 
democracy.42  Rather, what the Revolution Society had failed 
to understand was that King James had been deposed 
rightfully by Parliament because he had broken an 
historical contract between himself and his subjects.  
Burke commented that such egregious misconduct, however, 
was not to be found in France.43 
 In addition, the Society held up a post-Revolution 
National Assembly as the acme of freedom.  This incensed 
Burke, who argued that England benefited from quite enough 
freedom, and more, the ancient guarantees to ensure it.44  
Advocation of pure democracy was, he believed, to jettison 
blindly many of the good things the British Crown and its 
laws had established; the historical continuity of a 
monarchy was an assurance of the civil traditions that went 
with it.  A violent revolution would cast it all to the 
wind — and what was to prevent yet another revolution 
following that?45 
 The Society’s nonchalant, easy talk of revolution 
annoyed Burke as well.  The cashiering of kings, he 
retorted, “can rarely, if ever, be performed without 
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force.”  Violent conflict was fit for replacing only the 
vilest of tyrants, and the radicals at the Old Jewry were 
seemingly indifferent to the potential chaos such an 
upheaval would entail.  They were so “heated with their 
theories” that any calamity would be acceptable provided it 
altered the status quo; “It is with them a war or a 
revolution, or it is nothing.”46  Somehow, their systematic 
picture of Parliament’s shortcomings justified usurping its 
role, as though revolution were morally superior to the 
inequalities of representation.47 
 Again, Burke interpreted the backbone of the 
Revolution Society’s thinking as akin to French sophistry.  
Its members rejected common sense as “the wisdom of 
unlettered men” in favour of the rights of man — a 
philosophy so strong as to be nearly a scientific law.  At 
its best, Burke saw this “political metaphysics” as wishful 
abstract speculation, at worst, an inflexible obstacle; 
“Against these [rights of man] there can be no prescription 
... these admit no temperament, and no compromise.”48  
Therefore, the Society members were not so much against the 
monarchy’s abuses, but rather the legitimacy of its rule.  
For Burke, rights were social, rather than political, 
heritable instead of purely economic.  Men had rights to 
what was theirs by tradition (i.e., justice, property):  
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“In this partnership all men have equal rights; but not to 
equal things.”  A man had rights to the money in his 
pocket, but not control of a joint stock company, and 
certainly not to the management of the state.  “No man,” he 
warned, “should be judge in his own cause.”49 
 While the sentiments of the Revolution Society quite 
probably reflected its members’ sensibilities, Burke was 
well aware that much of their radical power was tied to its 
most vocal exponent, the Rev. Price.  It was with Price 
that his opinions clashed most heatedly, adding fuel to 
which was the fact that the clergyman was the associate of 
Burke’s enduring nemesis, William Petty, Earl of Shelburne 
(1737-1805), as were numerous other radical Dissenters, 
such as Joseph Priestley.50 
 Challenging the charismatic Price was not without 
hazard.  Upon sending an early draft of the Reflections to 
his friend Philip Francis, M.P. (1740-1818), he was warned 
that the work would damage his political and social 
standing irreparably if he lowered himself to a sarcastic 
“war of pamphlets with Doctor Price.”  As a populist, Price 
was not to be given such credibility as a reply from Burke 
would provide.  (Francis later reprimanded Burke for his 
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embarrassingly substandard prose in the Reflections:  “Once 
and for all, I wish you would let me teach you to write 
English.”)51  For his own part, Price’s only reply to the 
Reflections was the barest retort in the November 1790 
preface to the fourth printing of his sermon.52 
 Although Price was as concerned by abstract political 
theories of rights as any philosopher, Burke felt the true 
danger lay in his romanticization of the French Revolution, 
that it was somehow a paragon of human moral goodness fit 
for “effusions of sacred eloquence.”53  He was concerned 
that Price was blending non-conformist religious zeal with 
nebulous French radicalism.  Burke adjudged Price's 1789 
sermon as: 
 
... the public declaration of a man much 
connected with literary caballers, and intriguing 
philosophers; with political theologians and 
theological politicians, both at home and abroad.  
I know they set him up as a sort of oracle; 
because, with the best intentions in the world, 
he naturally philippizes, and chaunts his 
prophetic song in exact unison with their 
designs.54 
 Burke’s greatest abhorrence to the sermon was, in 
fact, that it was a sermon.  He accused Price of reviving 
an older tradition of politicizing the pulpit, which had 
last seen currency prior to the Civil War, “a novelty not 
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wholly without danger,” and hardly conducive to political 
moderation.55  Burke brought to mind incidents in the 1640s 
wherein clergy such as Price had preached politics to ranks 
of infantry with disastrous consequences.  Furthermore, 
Price had stated that Britain’s king was legitimate only 
because he owed his crown to the “choice of his people”; 
thereby, implying any other reason was criminal.  The 
Reverend’s congregations, Burke warned, were being 
“Habituated to it, as if it were a first principle admitted 
without dispute”; the religious tenor of such sentiments 
could infuse them with an intemperate radicalism.56 
 In his arguably most damning passage against Price in 
the Reflections, Burke placed him directly within the older 
tradition of malicious English preachers.  He compared 
Price’s self-confessed delight at the downfall of Louis XVI 
with Rev. Hugh Peters’ commensurate exultation in the 
beheading of Charles I.  Peters (1598-1660), an independent 
clergyman, was executed in the Restoration.57 
 Prior to 1790, Burke had been somewhat sympathetic to 
Dissenters’ concerns, notably their desire to repeal the 
Test and Corporations acts.58  He had also hoped to make 
some political inroads in that constituency (by cultivating 
his relationship with Priestley, for instance).  However, 
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his good disposition cooled as he began detecting that 
democratically-inclined parishioners supported the National 
Assembly’s seizure of church land.59  The publication of 
Price’s sermon had sold out in a single day, and Burke 
became watchful of religious groups allying with radicals.  
When prominent Dissenter Richard Bright wrote to him 
soliciting support for repealing the Test Act, Burke 
replied: 
 
I was much surprised to find religious assemblies 
turned into sort of places of exercise and 
discipline for politicks. ... Perhaps you have 
not seen these books which have gone thro’ 
several editions and are unanimously recommended 
by the Eastern [Baptist] Association a very 
numerous body of Dissenters.60 
 Burke’s son, Richard Burke Jr., had noted in July 1790 
that the connection between Dissenting leaders and the 
Revolution Society was very strong and continued to grow; 
in that month, some 652 persons attended a celebration at 
the Crown & Anchor tavern to honour the first anniversary 
of the Bastille’s fall.  Numerous Dissenters and ministers 
had attended, including Price, Dr. Abraham Rees (1743-99), 
and Dr. Joseph Towers (1737-99), pastor of the Old Jewry.  
Charles Stanhope had naturally been present as well, and 
Burke’s concern was that Dissenters and the Revolution 
Society would combine with elements in the Whig Party.  
Richard Jr. surmised that Stanhope and Price were indeed 
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aiming to bring Charles James Fox into their fold.  This 
ultimately did not happen, as Stanhope had a falling out 
with the Society over procedural issues, and resigned in 
November 1790.61 
 Burke now saw Dissenters as the cardinal threat to the 
crumbling sanity of the Whig Party.  Previously, republican 
Dissenters had constituted a few individuals skulking about 
the fringes of the Party, lobbying for a handful of issues.  
By late 1791 Burke believed they were rallying to the cause 
of revolution: 
 
I think, they compose a more active, a more 
spirited, and a more united body, than the 
Jacobites ever were. ... A foreign factious 
connexion is in the very essence of their 
politicks ... They wish to break down all 
barriers which tend to separate them from the 
counsels, designs, and assistance, of the 
republican, atheistical, faction of fanaticks in 
France.62 
He concluded that action should be taken, though 
politicians might be hesitant in provoking the Dissenter 
constituency: 
 
“But the root of evil is abroad; and the way to 
secure us at home is to deprive mischievous 
factions of their foreign alliances.”63 
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 Indeed, in a March 4, 1793 Commons speech, Burke had 
denounced the Revolution Society, going so far as to list 
the forty members of its Committee of Correspondence, which 
included several noteworthy Dissenters, such as the Rev. 
Rees.  Two days later, the M.P. for Preston, Sir Henry 
Hoghton (Rees’s fellow Presbyterian), wrote Burke, 
castigating him for including Rees amongst the members.  
(He was informed directly that the Dissenting minister was 
perpetually being listed in Society publications, such as A 
Vindication of the Revolution Society Against the Calumnies 
of Mr. Burke).64 
 The controversy with Price before long had become 
somewhat irrelevant, as the Reverend was gravely ill by 
late 1790, and died in March 1791.  This did not mitigate 
Burke’s disquiet about the Dissenters, and from thence he 
directed his ire at other suspects, markedly, Joseph 
Priestley.  It is quite probable that Burke would not have 
taken Priestley quite so seriously but for the fact that 
the Unitarian combined in himself the natures of political 
radical, natural philosopher, and theologian.  To Burke, 
this identified him with the very vanguard of what he was 
decrying in France.65 
 Initially, Burke had been in many ways eager to court 
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Priestley’s political voice as he had with the Dissenters 
as a whole.  In September 1789 letters to Charles James Fox 
and Cpt. John Willet Payne (a friend of the royal family), 
he suggested they urge Priestley to dedicate a new book to 
the Prince of Wales, thereby gaining the Dissenter’s 
influence in the upcoming election.66 
 Burke had first publicly turned on Priestley’s radical 
politics on March 2, 1790 in his speech addressing the 
repeal of the Test Act.  In it he made specific links 
between Dissenters such as Priestley and the revolutionary 
movements by quoting, from amongst others, Price’s sermon, 
a letter discussing the intrigues of Lancashire clergy, and 
Priestley’s Letters to the Rev. E. Burn.  Their 
consolidated agenda (including Priestley’s), he argued, was 
to subvert the Church of England, by appealing to the sort 
of abstract rights advocated by the French philosophes.  He 
therefore would not work to repeal the Act unless those 
more reasonable Dissenters were willing to step forward and 
declare their interests without the baggage of political 
radicalism.67 
 Burke held Priestley’s scientific and literary talents 
in high regard, but objected to his willingness to view the 
calamity of revolution as a necessary sacrifice for 
political progress.  In the Reflections he quoted 
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Priestley’s History of the Corruptions of Christianity to 
this effect, wherein Priestley had predicted that the 
alliance of church and state could be broken only when the 
“civil powers” had first fallen.68 
 Priestley did not acquiesce to Burke’s published 
criticism or public speeches, and restated his confidence 
in the rightness of the French Revolution and its 
principles in January 1791, when he published (in 
Birmingham, London, and Paris) Letters to the Right 
Honourable Edmund Burke Occasioned by His Reflections on 
the Revolution in France.  Here Priestley once more put 
forth his disapproval of the established churches and 
ecclesiastical property, and encouraged the National 
Assembly to expand its work.69 
 Eventually, Burke would come to see himself as 
Priestley’s literary opposite number.  In a June 1792 
letter to a French priest, he sardonically referred to 
himself as “the Aristophanes to the Birmingham Socrates, 
and am supposed to prepare the minds of the people to 
persecute him by my talents for ridicule.”70 
 The reference to persecution was not a light one, as 
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Priestley had been the victim of the Birmingham Riots the 
previous summer.  Interestingly, Burke had already 
ruminated that Britons were not necessarily on the side of 
men such as Priestley, and a serious reaction was possible.  
This was somewhat fulfilled in July 14-17, 1791, when a 
mob, supposedly riled by a Revolution Dinner, attacked and 
burned Priestley’s house — assuming wrongly that he had 
organized the event.  London papers reported it to have 
been provoked by Presbyterians circulating anti-monarchical 
and anti-ecclesiastical handbills, whilst the diners had 
toasted the destruction of the government and the death of 
the King.  Priestley denied any knowledge of the handbills 
and toasts, or even being present.71 
 Burke was aghast by the riots, feeling that it was now 
ever more urgent for cooler heads to subdue revolutionary 
radicals by superior arguments, lest similar mobs attempt 
to deal with the latent threats themselves.  The entire 
incident had been embarrassing for Burke, as he felt the 
rioters had weakened his cause, instigating in its name, 
the very sort of French chaos he was condemning.  Moreover, 
the press had insinuated that he himself was an agitator of 
sorts, whilst not reproaching radicals like Priestley for 
their indiscretion in promoting revolt.72 
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 In the wake of the attack on Priestley’s home, Burke 
worried that the Dissenting faction, which he already did 
not trust, would exploit it to gain sympathy for their 
revolutionary causes.  On September 1, 1791, a gathering of 
Yorkshire Dissenters had denounced the riots, criticized 
the existing parliamentary franchise, and once again 
offered congratulations to French Revolutionaries for 
throwing off the yoke of a similarly despotic government.  
They also proposed unanimously to draft a letter to 
Priestley sending regrets for his loss, and lauding his 
civil libertarian work.  Burke commented:  “They publickly 
adopt Priestley and his Cause; they give him compliments of 
condolence and encouragement, and declare him a martyr — a 
martyr to what?”73 
 This “martyrdom” annoyed Burke more than anything, 
along with what he believed to be Priestley’s self-
perception of innocence in regards to the riots.  Priestley 
had written an open letter to the denizens of Birmingham, 
Appeal to the Public on the Subject of the Riots in 
Birmingham, in which he had presented himself as a gentle, 
reasonable Christian, chastising them for their contrasting 
unchristian savagery.  He admonished them, saying:  “We are 
better instructed in the mind and forbearing spirit of 
Christianity, than ever to think of having recourse to 
violence ...”  Burke was incensed by what he deemed 
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hypocrisy, as he observed how Priestley was himself an 
advocate of revolution.74 
 His suspicions about the riots bringing Dissenters 
closer to radical causes was apparently correct.  Within a 
year of the Birmingham commotion, Burke became convinced 
that Priestley’s political aims were increasingly being 
championed within Dissenting circles: 
 
This affair of Birmingham which frightend them at 
first, now fortifies them.  They come forth as 
persecuted men.  They all, as fast as they can 
meet, take up Priestley, and avowedly set him up 
as their head.75 
By 1792, this was becoming a serious problem in Burke’s 
view.  In March of that year, the Manchester Constitutional 
Society had sent an address to the Society of Jacobins, and 
congratulated Tom Paine for authoring his Rights of Man 
(which was a riposte to Burke, who declared it an 
“infamous” work).76 
 The Manchester Society had been formed in October 1790 
as a response to the conservative Church & King Society, 
which in March 1790 had formed in celebration of the defeat 
of the motion to repeal the Test Act.  The Manchester 
group, though formed by Thomas Walker, an Anglican Whig 
merchant, was one of numerous radical groups assembling at 
the time, and whose membership brimmed with leading 
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Dissenters.77 
 Burke had denounced the Manchester Society’s March 
1792 meeting in a Commons speech on April 30, but the 
prominence of the members in its ranks made a deep 
impression on him.  For the moment, the supporters of the 
French Revolution had been frustrated by the British 
invasion of France, in concert with the Prussians and 
Austrians.  Burke remained skeptical.  In an August 18 
letter to Buckinghamshire M.P., William Grenville, he 
explained: 
 
I am thoroughly convinced that the faction of 
English Jacobins though a little under a cloud 
for the present, is neither destroyed nor 
disheartened. ... So sure as we have an 
existence, if [Revolutionary] things should go on 
in France, as go on they may, so sure it is that 
in the ripeness of their time, the same tragedies 
will be acted in England.78 
He went on to list the rogues: 
 
Carra and Condorcet, and Santerre and Manuel, and 
Petion and their brethren the Priestleys, the 
Coopers and the Watts’, the deputies of the body 
of the Dissenters and others at Manchester, who 
embraced Carra in the midst of the Jacobin Club, 
the Revolution Society that recievd Petion in 
London — the whole race of the affiliated, who 
are numerous and powerful, whose principles, 
dispositions and wishes, are the very same, are 
as closely connected as ever, and they do not 
fail to mark and to use every thing that shews a 
remissness, or any equivocal appearance in the 
                     
77
 Edward Royle, Revolutionary Brittania? Reflections on the Threat of 
Revolution in Britain, 1789-1848 (Manchester:  Manchester University 
Press, 2000), p. 14. 
78
 Burke, “Letter to Lord Grenville - August 18, 1792”, The 
Correspondence of Edmund Burke VII, p. 177. 
 41 
government, to their advantage.79 
In August of 1792, Burke was further repelled by what he 
maintained was Priestley’s hypocrisy and gall, when he 
accepted French citizenship, but graciously declined the 
offer of a seat in the French National Convention.  He 
wrote in his most supremely sarcastic of tones: 
 
... with what audacity Priestley comes out, avows 
himself a Citizen of that Republick of Robbers 
and assassins ... publickly wishes them all 
success — though he does not choose from a sacred 
regard to his own safety, to put himself in 
danger of being hanged by the King of Prussia on 
the one hand, or by the gentlemen of his own 
faction on the other, who threaten to massacre 
their delegates if their conduct does not suit 
with their humours.80 
 Burke mentioned Priestley in his letters only one 
further time before his death.  In the October 4 Morning 
Chronicle of 1792, he had read of Priestley’s reluctance to 
serve in the National Convention.  He remarked in a letter 
to his longtime friend Lord Fitzwilliam (1748-1833), that 
he had read more letters of Priestley’s “to other of the 
murderers in which he censures some excesses; or indeed 
rather laments them for no other reason than as tending to 
hurt so good a cause.”  The letters, however, apparently do 
not correspond to any Priestley is known to have written.  
It would seem that Burke’s last thoughts on Priestley were 
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spurious in source.81 
 Burke was nearing retirement from public life by the 
end of 1792, and made good on his promise to retreat into 
private life in 1795.  While concerns about the Revolution 
and radical activity were not absent from his mind, the 
Irish Question evidently monopolized his thoughts, and he 
drew no obvious satisfaction from the fulfillment of his 
prophecy of the Terror. 
 Burke’s status has undoubtedly benefited from the fact 
that on many counts history proved him correct, and not by 
coincidence.  In some ways it is perhaps adequate to agree 
with the traditional assessment of him as the father of 
modern conservatism — if indeed its definition is the 
desire to moderate the pace of change with the past’s 
circumspection.  Yet ironically, the success of Revolution 
without, and the threat of it within, served to rescue him 
from the wastelands of British political fortune.  In 1789, 
Burke's influence was at its nadir, and he was viewed (and 
viewed himself) as a man long past his prime. 
 In previous years, he had championed causes of 
principle, but it was the troubles in France which roused 
Burke's ire, stirring the might of his intellect and the 
eloquence of his pen.  The events did not merely restore 
him to a place of significance in British politics, but 
made him an international voice with which to be reckoned.82 
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 Even in his own day, Burke was regarded as being 
overwrought with suspicion, sounding tocsins of alarm over 
irrelevant threats.  However, this was a consequence of an 
intellectual grappling with the ideas of other 
intellectuals, be they French philosophers or Dissenting 
clergymen.  In treading this ground his notions of liberty 
were quite distinct, neither wholly clinging to absolute 
monarchies of the past, nor embracing what he held to be 
the unreasonableness of speculators who desired immediate 
reform while dismissing its consequences. 
 In spite of his critics, Burke remained, in his own 
fashion, a defender of the rights of man.  The foundation 
of his ideals, however, were to be found in the past, not 
the future.  In his own Rights of Man, Tom Paine accused 
him of making “tragic paintings” rooted more in a 
collection of nostalgic tales than in modern reality.  He 
wrote:  “But Mr. Burke should recollect that he is writing 
History, and not Plays; and that his readers will expect 
truth ...”83  Paine was mistaken if he believed Burke was 
not conscious of writing an historical work, as Burke was 
commenting on the direct consequences of history’s actors.  
He described the basic business of revolutionaries as: 
 
... to spread opinions ... which can have no 
other effect than to root out all principle from 
the minds of the common people, and to put a 
dagger into the hands of every rustick to plunge 
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into the heart of his landlord.84 
Yet Paine was also correct that Edmund Burke had exploited 
history in service of his own purposes, rather than 
yielding it up for the common man’s scrutiny.  Burke could 
not have faith in innovative reason.  He said so himself: 
 
You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am 
bold enough to confess, that we are generally men 
of untaught feelings; that instead of casting 
away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a 
very considerable degree, and, to take more shame 
to ourselves, we cherish them because they are 
prejudices; and the longer they have lasted, and 
the more generally they have prevailed, the more 
we cherish them.85 
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PART II 
 
 If Edmund Burke had stared into the pool of 
Enlightenment and seen only and unequivocally a French 
Revolution bubbling to the surface, Roy Porter, some two 
centuries later, saw no less turbulence, but far more 
complexity.  Though Porter devoted a large measure of his 
work to unraveling the same issues, the philosophes were to 
him only one (rather indirect) piece of the Revolution's 
puzzle, and the intellectuals of Burke's England a great 
deal more dynamic. 
 Porter felt the notion and term "revolution" in its 
general sense to be a loaded one.  As he put it: 
The concept has increasingly been overworked, 
debased, and almost done to death.  By a process 
of the inflation of historians' vocabulary, what 
formerly might have been termed a 'shift', or a 
'change' becomes a 'revolution' ...86 
 
He nonetheless believed that certain massive events were 
undoubtedly worthy of the title —- the Russian, Industrial, 
or French Revolutions. 
 Though Porter frequently discussed the distinct 
national characteristics of Enlightenment in each state, 
France was for him an evident anomaly amongst eighteenth-
century intellectual cultures.  The country was seemingly 
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possessed of groups of relatively literate citizens and a 
body of thinking elites who were essentially independent of 
the Crown's patronage.  Moreover, the philosophes were 
brave enough to risk censure, and articulate in defiance 
when disseminating their ideas to wide audiences.  He 
mused: 
It would be extravagant to imply that the French 
Enlightenment brought about the French 
Revolution.  But the movement certainly helped to 
create a situation in which ideological loyalty 
to the old regime was eroded and the regime 
destabilized.87 
 
Despite this, Reflections on the Revolution's central 
preoccupation — radical intellectuals as the cause of the 
Revolution — often seemed irksome to Porter.  He dubbed it 
a "weary question" and though addressing it intermittently, 
he was more concerned with the protean panorama of 
individuals, goals, and ideas which he felt constituted the 
era as a gestalt.88 
 In Porter's eyes, Burke (one of the 1790s' "vociferous 
reactionary ideologues") had missed the point of the 
philosophes' movement in reducing it to political 
revolution: 
It is by-and-large an idle business to blame or 
praise the philosophes for what happened in 1789 
and beyond.  In any case, almost all its leaders 
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were by then dead, so we cannot divine their 
reactions.89 
 
Indeed, many luminaries of the era, such as Erasmus Darwin, 
might have initially cheered the ancien régime's fall, but 
had ultimately abjured it in the Terror's wake.90  The true 
question, to which Burke did not fully attend, concerned 
the actual intentions of the philosophes, and the shift in 
how Europeans viewed themselves as men functioning in 
nature and society. 
 In the main, Porter regarded Burke's contribution to 
the historiography of Enlightenment as a dubious one.  
Along with the Abbé Barruel, Porter placed him at the head 
of the tradition denouncing philosophes as 
immature rationalists, whose a priori and 
irresponsible sloganizing ... helped to topple 
the old order, only to produce first anarchy, and 
then a new despotism, in its place.91 
 
It begged the question of whether this handful of French 
thinkers truly constituted the sum total of the Enlightened 
Age – and their impact upon it. 
 While at many points Porter also lauded Peter Gay's 
seminal work The Enlightenment:  An Interpretation, he was 
notably critical of its claim that the movement was born 
principally from the writings of a few towering giants such 
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as Voltaire and Rousseau.  Gay had devoted pages to them 
"as if they had almost single-handedly engineered the 
French Revolution."92  Porter did not disagree that they 
were genuinely complex figures, representative of their 
time, but wondered about the "seedbed" from whence these 
"prize blooms" had grown. 
 Grappling with the problem of how significant the 
philosophes were in effecting radical change in the 
eighteenth-century, he asked if it were equally or more 
possible that, say, democratic ideals and republicanism 
were products of "the swelling ranks of articulate and 
cultured men and women throughout Europe?"93  This might 
entail that the ancien régime had in some measure become 
enlightened, rather than simply being the object of 
intellectual terrorists hoping to explode its institutions. 
 Moreover, if Gay had been correct in describing the 
profound influence of a few men of letters with the "power 
to change the very course of human affairs", where was the 
practical evidence?  Voltaire, Porter noted, certainly had 
the ear of Frederick the Great for a spell, but Prussia's 
militarism and basic lack of liberty hardly bore any 
hallmarks of the Frenchman's philosophy.  It was perhaps 
more useful to consider the end goals of the philosophes: 
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was revolution an outcome they truly desired?  Or were they 
more concerned with promoting reason and science which in 
the longer course of history would reform men's minds?94 
 Porter did not hold to notions that the philosophes 
formulated any sort of agenda resulting in the wholesale 
destruction of the prevailing political (or even social) 
order.  He stated: 
It has been assumed – since Burke – that the 
eruption of the French Revolution in the name of 
liberty, equality and fraternity gives the French 
Enlightenment a warranted place in conservative 
demonology, unlike perhaps the English.  But as 
Robert Darnton has shown, relations between the 
High Enlightenment and the French Revolution are 
anything but clear.  Many philosophes had 
feathered comfortable nests within the ancien 
régime – as revolutionary pamphleteers 
complained.95 
 
In truth, it did not appear that many French philosophers 
were deeply dedicated to democracy, atheism, or 
materialism.  The harsh critiques of clergymen and monarchs 
produced some trenchant slogans later mythologized by 
adherents and foes, but the links to subsequent pike-
wielding revolutionaries seemed tenuous.96 
 At issue, for example, was the first-hand involvement 
of the Voltaires and Diderots to unseating their king's 
regime.  Porter remarked that these "noisy political 
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lightweights" spent no serious energy organizing political 
resistance, and were not keen to see a full-scale revolt 
against the status quo.  Outside short periods of 
incarceration, they were rarely in serious jeopardy whilst 
receiving the laudations of literary salons.  In contrast, 
Porter recalled the blood-soaked fates suffered by 
multitudes of heretics and freethinkers in the preceding 
two centuries (e.g., Bruno or Campanella) – or even the 
political radicals persecuted in nineteenth-century Russia 
and Austria.97 
 Another incongruity that distanced the philosophes 
from the Enlightenment's legacy was their faint support for 
many of the values with which it later came to be 
associated.  Few seemed to have championed universal 
suffrage or elected parliaments, for instance, which Porter 
believed they dismissed as outmoded tools of aristocrats 
and Athenians.  More acutely, he suggested that men such as 
Voltaire were elitists who had little reason to regard 
ignorant, superstitious, illiterate serfs as intellectually 
worthy of political participation.  Rather, the heart of 
their disquisition was the competence and reasonableness of 
their monarchs.98 
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 Porter also identified a shift during the 
Enlightenment in the matters which occupied philosophes' 
minds.  At the outset of the age, thinkers such as Locke 
and Montesquieu concerned themselves with the battle 
against tyranny or examining the related issue of political 
legitimacy.  By the mid-eighteenth-century, however, their 
focus had turned to debating the ends and uses of power: 
What type of system could produce virtue in men?, What 
policies would foster trade or public health?  This was 
optimistic thinking, but Porter cautioned that it set 
philosophes on a slippery slope, running "the risk of 
degenerating into a proliferation of wish lists or even 
utopian fantasies."99 
 Like Burke, Porter named Montesquieu as one of the 
era's most thorough commentators on the subject of proper 
government.  Unlike Burke, he viewed The Spirit of the Laws 
as a fairly bleak analysis.  Though Montesquieu had admired 
republicanism as a form of polity, he did not believe it 
was a system suited for his own era, whilst the alternative 
— monarchy — tended to devolve into despotism without close 
attention.  Therefore, the only bodies capable of 
preserving traditional liberties were the nobility and 
perhaps the Catholic Church, institutions whose glaring 
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defects Montesquieu had already exposed in his Persian 
Letters.100 
 Porter found Rousseau nearly as pessimistic and 
impotent as Montesquieu, though he certainly did not revile 
him, as had Burke.  Rousseau had rejected the worth of 
constitutionalism in reforming society, and to his mind, 
the entire structure was rotten from within, and no piece 
of paper it produced could ever restore man to his natural 
place in the world.101  In general, Porter observed a 
disposition amongst French intellectuals advocating central 
organization in politics and society, provided it promoted 
the general good.  He offered Rousseau's dream of arresting 
humanity's degeneration by forced moral goodness, or 
Helvétius's utilitarian proposals for governance, which 
presumed humans were by nature, identical, malleable, and 
capable of conditioning through education and 
environment.102 
 What this amounted to, as Porter argued it, was that 
instead of ruminating upon the tremendously complex issue 
of who had legitimacy to govern, the philosophes typically 
chose to concentrate on how the existing figures should 
rule.  For their philosophical purposes, this meant 
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promoting justice and economic prosperity within civil 
society, and in particular, the extension of rights to men; 
to publish, think, worship, and speak.  The quintessential 
epigraph was the description in Voltaire's Lettres 
philosophiques:  freedom of trade in London's Stock 
Exchange creating interaction and equality amongst 
multifarious religious groups.103  This was not violent 
political revolt on paper, but rather a call to secularize 
European public life.  It was this project, and not 1789, 
which Porter argued to be the definitive legacy of the 
philosophes, manifesting their influence most concretely.104 
 Indeed, Porter had pondered whether the great minds of 
France would have in fact repudiated much of what the 1790s 
produced: 
To what extent, and until when, would the great 
philosophes have approved the French Revolution? 
– a revolution which executed Lavoisier and 
hunted Condorcet, one rejected by latter-day 
philosophes like Raynal and Marmontel?  Perhaps 
their reaction would have been those of 
Enlightened Englishmen like Erasmus Darwin, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge or Bishop Richard Watson:  
the bubbling enthusiasm of the toast to Liberty 
turning to poison in the very cup.105 
 
A supreme irony for Porter was his firm conviction that 
those great French philosophes were in many ways the 
willing students of the Enlightened English — in light of 
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Burke's concern that the storm of ideas was crossing the 
Channel from the other direction.  Porter remarked that it 
was hardly a secret that Frenchmen such as Diderot or 
Voltaire lionized British intellectuals and their 
philosophical traditions, framing England's civil liberties 
and political reasonableness as the very mould in which a 
modern France could be cast.  He wrote: 
... the philosophes themselves looked to England 
as the birthplace of the modern.  Anglophiles in 
France, Italy and the Holy Roman Empire 
celebrated Britain's constitutional monarchy and 
freedom under the law, its open society, its 
prosperity and religious toleration.106 
 
The historiographic misfortune, however, was that few 
writers had ever bothered with such details as the "English 
Enlightenment", and historians such as Ernst Cassirer, 
preferred to depict "a conservative John Bull as the 
buttress of counter-revolution."107 
 If anything, Porter proposed that the spirit of that 
much admired English Enlightenment was best captured by the 
political reformist culture in late eighteenth-century 
London, one rooted in esteem for the Glorious Revolution.  
Its mood, he said, was 
... progressive but not incendiary, broad church 
and confident enough to include toasts to 
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prelates and people alike, to embrace Anglicans 
and Dissenters, and to extend sympathy to 
unfortunates.  Such relaxed, tolerant optimism 
did not long survive the outbreak of the French 
Revolution.108 
 
English intellectuals, of course, were not necessarily so 
far removed from their French counterparts, and here Porter 
did not take issue with Peter Gay in the view that they 
were in large part composed from the genteel classes.  As, 
for example, some of the Lunar Society's constituents 
appeared to demonstrate, they 
... celebrated progress, deplored slavery, and 
saluted the outbreak of the French Revolution ... 
Yet none took up the cause of the 'people'; and 
the mob which immolated Joseph Priestley's home 
in 1790 illustrated the gap vividly.109 
 
Yet if the salons of the well-to-do were the nurseries of 
French free thought, Porter remarked that, coevally in 
England, it was the educational academies and universities 
which had acquired (and sometimes earned) reputations for 
transforming young Britons into radicals and dissenters.  
He noted that a host of Priestleys and Godwins had 
graduated from such ranks, and that Burke's opinion of the 
schools as "the new arsenal in which subversive doctrines 
and arguments were forged" was not far off.110 
                     
108
 Porter, The Creation the Modern World, pp. 446-447. 
109
 Porter, The Enlightenment, p. 44. 
110
 Roy Porter, English Society in the Eighteenth Century (Penguin Books:  
London, 1982), p. 179. 
 56 
 Despite the relatively robust industrial and economic 
growth in Britain at the eighteenth-century's end, Porter 
observed that the period was subject equally to social 
pressures which were swelling to boiling point.  
Disparities between rich and poor, shifts in population 
distribution, riots, soaring crime, and perceived 
inequities in political representation were breeding 
increasingly extreme political ideas.  "And yet," Porter 
opined, "until the dawn of the French Revolution, these 
portents were but straws in the wind."  The fall of the 
Bastille and its consequences only added lightning to the 
thunder and heightened the ideological polarization: 
From 1793 war against revolutionary France — with 
crippling taxes, inflation, press-gangs, trade 
disruption, anti-war protests, and (in 1797) 
naval mutinies and the counteracting waves of 
loyalist bullying — created unparalleled 
antagonisms within English society.111 
 
 Though the threat of full-on revolt in England 
appeared increasingly ominous amidst the French turmoil, 
Porter did not feel that any of the decade's commotion was 
genuinely new, save for the semiotics of the liberal 
ideologies.  The Tom Painites, for example, were building 
on the republican foundations established in the 
seventeenth-century.  The nineties radicals, though, were 
                     
111
 Ibid., p. 366. 
 57 
in his estimation rather more advanced, what with the 
upsurge in debating societies, the ubiquity of politicized 
Methodist and Dissenting preachers, the scores upon scores 
of cut-rate pamphleteers and publishers, and the spread of 
newspapers into the counties.112 
 Indeed, if political reformers had initially looked 
back upon the Glorious Revolution as confirming traditional 
rights in English society, Porter argued that a more 
radical turn came about in the wake of the French 
Revolution when agitators such as the Rev. Richard Price 
reinterpreted 1688 as the primordial volley for the rights 
of man — and claimed events in France as the logical 
progression: 
[Price] challenged his compatriots:  if they 
supported the real principles of 1688 and were 
true believers in liberty, they must embrace the 
French Revolution.113 
 
And yet, though many of the anxious ingredients which had 
brought about the French cataclysm were palpable in 
England, it came effectively to nil.  Porter reasoned, 
... such tensions as existed did not reach 
breaking-point, because the state had already 
conceded liberty of expression and plenty of 
scope for the development of civil society and 
economy.  The activities of independent writers, 
propagandists, critics, industrialists and so 
forth were no real threat to the state.  English 
intellectuals and artists, while often vocally 
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anti-king or anti-ministry, profoundly identified 
themselves with the cause of the nation at large 
...
114
 
 
 Porter specified two reasons in particular why the 
revolutionary fervor in England (though not necessarily 
Scotland or Ireland) had "fizzled out", as he put it.  
Firstly, there had been no coherent solidarity amongst the 
radicals as a group; "there was not yet a mass proletarian 
consciousness ... and the ideology of English jacobinism 
remained individualistic."115 
 More importantly, there was the Terror, which further 
splintered political blocs, especially amongst Whigs who 
were already fractured into pro- and anti-Revolution 
factions, and therefore reduced as potential threats to 
government or status quo.  At heart, Porter reflected, 
English radicals like Paine or Thomas Spence were more 
truly children of Enlightenment ideals, and adhered 
optimistically to the conviction that change 
... would not come about by force of arms but by 
spontaneous rational enlightenment.  Radical 
intellectuals speechified and scribbled, but it 
was all sound and fury, for few had the stomach 
for killing and all feared mob extremism.116 
 
Liberty, he argued, was for such writers not necessarily a 
direct political goal, nor was violent revolution. 
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 In any case, most English working men typically viewed 
the William Godwins and William Frends as counterfeit 
insurrectionists or eloquent fantasists.  As gory as the 
French Revolution was, Porter noted that Britain itself had 
already suffered a substantial glimpse of violent revolt in 
the decades preceding, and it may well have lingered in the 
memories of politically-minded Londoners.  The Gordon Riots 
of 1780 had caused £100,000 in property damage, a cost 
which he cited as tenfold greater than that incurred from 
the entire French Revolution.117 
 The Terror's bitter tang repelled numerous liberal and 
radical English thinkers; many abandoned their enlightened 
ideals and progressive visions of a rationally structured 
world fostering a fraternal, egalitarian order.  Porter 
pondered the retreat, writing: 
The Dissenter-scientist Joseph Priestley might 
gravely warn that 'the English hierarchy ... has 
equal reason to tremble at an air pump or an 
electrical machine.'  Yet he was wrong, for 
science (like Romanticism and religion) could 
equally serve reaction.  It was fashionable 
society that flocked to the Royal Institution ... 
Its wizard experimentalist, Humphry Davy, a poor 
Cornish boy made good, assured his glamorous 
audience that science proved 'society was 
necessarily and rightly grounded on property and 
inequality.'118 
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It was not the radicals' ostensibly bellicose prescriptions 
which were the Enlightenment's detritus.  Where Burke had 
been far more perspicacious, Porter remarked, was in 
identifying another, more fundamental facet of his age:  
the (perhaps self-obsessed) fascination with new systems of 
thinking. 
Such blether epitomized the modern infatuation 
with singularity, one blithely eager, in the name 
of the New Science, to reduce human beings to 
machines or puppets.  Humanists like Johnson and 
Burke abhorred any apparent relinquishing of the 
lofty, if daunting, human obligation to exercise 
free will and moral choice.119 
 
Burke's argument, according to Porter, was at base a 
philosophical one, and represented a significant change in 
thinking from the Enlightenment.  It was 
... a reassertion of the frailty and depravity of 
human nature.  Reaction became philosophized on 1 
November 1790, with Burke's Reflections. ... 
Burke pulled the rug out from under enlightened 
faith in permanent progress ... Moreover, the 
seasoned Whig bared the dark secret of 
revolutionary fervor:  new enlightenment was but 
old illumination writ large, the Revolution 
enthusiasm resurrected — but, this time, 
enthusiasm without religion.120 
 
Burke was not, of course, the only conservative commentator 
to sense such creeping religious atavism in the eighteenth-
century.  Porter recounted that while Edward Gibbon had 
loathed tyrannic absolutist monarchs, he feared the 
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anarchic zealotry of mob rule even more, and consequently 
denounced both revolutionaries and despots in the same 
breath.  But the latter crowd (including French radicals) 
was, in the arch-secularist's eyes, cut from the same cloth 
as fanatical Cromwellian Puritans.  Gibbon spoke of 
"Jacobin missionaries" as ideological brothers of the anti-
Catholic Gordon rioters.121 
 Burke, though, was the far more influential and 
pointed critic.  Porter interpreted his attack on 
radicalism as a fight against a revived form of levelling, 
and thereafter, liberalism's enlightened origins would be 
historiographically stained: 
The radical cause was thereby tarred by Burke 
with the brush of cranky cults as mesmerism.  
Prophets like Price who proclaimed the 
millennium, and rationalist metaphysicians who 
touted a do-it-yourself State — all provided 
sitting targets:  there was nothing to choose, 
Burke implied, between sophisters and the 
mindless mob.122 
 
Still, Porter did not feel that Reflections on the 
Revolution had had much success in quelling revolutionary 
sentiment in Britain, or at least in quashing sympathy for 
the sans-culottes: 
Not even Burke could stem the tide.  Political 
societies sprang up, comprising radical craftsmen 
and the petty bourgeoisie, headed by journalists, 
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intellectuals and disaffected gentlemen. ... Many 
returned Burke's fire — the Reflections drew at 
least thirty-eight replies ...123 
 
 Those replies, Porter estimated, were certainly 
successful, as Burke's sedulous arch-nemesis, Tom Paine, 
demonstrated with his "radical bible" Rights of Man.  By 
1793, "a staggering 200,000 copies were allegedly in 
circulation — Burke's Reflections sold only a seventh of 
that number."124  The philosophical clash was a substantial 
one, with both men prodding at the heart of England's 
intellectual traditions: 
Paine's quarrel with Burke concerned the 
stranglehold of history.  Burke had contended 
that the revolutionary settlement bound 
posterity, thus denying the people's right to 
choose or cashier their own governors.  But the 
Parliament of 1688 had actually done precisely 
that, asserted Paine, and 'every age and 
generation must be as free to act for itself, in 
all cases, as the ages and generations which 
preceded it.'125 
 
 The dust storm stirred in Britain by the French 
Revolution enveloped far more than Burke or Paine, and the 
larger shift in the intellectual mood of Englishmen also 
intrigued Porter.  The Terror's wrath cemented whatever 
cynicism had been hibernating inside enlightened British 
minds.  The death of Louis XVI and France's declaration of 
war on England "turned reaction into style" as he described 
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it; ideas of certain progress and equality acquired trite 
connotations.126  For many, the alternative was a darker 
realism: 
The Enlightenment dream that there was indeed a 
hidden hand, which without human effort, united 
'self love and social' ... faded with the new 
century's dismal Malthusian and Ricardian visions 
of ineradicable class antagonism, population 
explosion, the iron-law of starvation wages, and 
crises of over-production.127 
 
 Nonetheless, it was equally likely, in Porter's mind, 
that a post-Revolution Englishman might in disillusionment 
succumb to a very different type of reaction.  To a great 
extent, events in France had fostered Romantic, anti-
rationalist sentiment in Britain, bringing about an intense 
revival of religious belief on the wings of 
evangelicalism.128  Church attendance flourished in the 
immediate period following 1789, and as the decade 
unfolded, radical politics associated with Dissenters 
became tainted as religious life shifted towards less-
established, yet more conservative evangelical 
denominations.  On this, Porter plucked a quote from 
Georgian pundit Arthur Young:  'The true Christian will 
never listen to French politics or to French philosophy.'129 
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 Concomitant with the decade's burgeoning Christianity 
was a move on the part of many philanthropists to promote 
moral uplift within British society.  Porter commented that 
Painite dissertations on revolutions and rights often truly 
did bear a levelling tone, and its stated goals of smashing 
ancient social orders served to reinforce the backlash.  In 
point of fact, moral tract societies had already been 
"snowing down throughout the century" and ultimately 
"became a blizzard raised by the chilling gusts of the 
French Revolution."130 
 In spite of this, not all British intellectuals of the 
late eighteenth-century executed an about face on 
enlightened values after the Terror's tempest.  Porter 
offered Thomas Beddoes as an unrepentant (and somewhat Tom 
Paine-like) example: 
In 1789, he welcomed the cause of liberté, 
égalité, and fraternité, and, unlike such friends 
as Coleridge, he never backslid from his 
commitments, though he was not so blinkered as 
not to notice that the heady ideals of 1789 had 
become stained by blood, extremism, and events.131 
 
In the tremulous atmosphere which had produced the 
Birmingham riots, this was a stance which made academic and 
political life exceedingly difficult for such 
nonconformists; indeed, as Porter noted, Beddoes was under 
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Home Office surveillance throughout 1792.132  As much as 
radicals like Beddoes (or his frequent correspondent the 
M.P. Davies Giddy) might have deplored the distasteful 
metamorphosis of French republicanism, they were more 
sensitive to the apparent degradation of freedom close to 
home: 
... Beddoes bewailed the counter-revolutionary 
backlash in England.  For, in his view, the wily 
William Pitt seized the chance afforded first by 
fear, and then by the outbreak of Anglo-French 
hostilities, to wage diabolical war on English 
liberties ... arresting Painite leaders, and 
introducing gagging bills.133 
 
The chill cut a broad swath through British intellectual 
life.  Erasmus Darwin, for instance, who had been a devout 
booster for revolution in France, found his notions of 
human developmental progress as decidedly unwelcome as much 
for their philosophical implications as for their religious 
ramifications.  The legacy of political contentiousness was 
undoubtedly inherited by his grandson in the Victorian era: 
Erasmus Darwin's evolutionary theories were not 
accepted in his own day.  Evolutionary thinking 
long lay under a cloud, being condemned as 
materialistic and atheistic and associated with 
that great abomination, the French Revolution.  
Therein lay one of the reasons why his grandson, 
Charles, was so hesitant about publishing his own 
evolutionary theory.134 
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 Beyond this, the general mood of the times was abject 
disillusionment.  Enlightened Englishmen across the 
spectrum, from fervent radicals to idealistic armchair 
philosophers, felt the Revolution's implosion as 
parishioners caught within a collapsing cathedral of glass.  
The Enlightenment, it was assumed, had failed, and escape 
into Romanticism or reaction was the coming order of the 
day.  Porter held up writer William Hazlitt as typical of 
the disenchanted generation: 
A prose Byron, Hazlitt characterized his times as 
the age of betrayal:  England had betrayed 
itself, and France the Revolution; the lake poets 
betrayed their Jacobinism; the English 
politicians betrayed the constitution and the 
spirit of liberty; Burke betrayed his liberal 
principles, Bentham betrayed humanity and Malthus 
and Godwin betrayed experience.135 
 
 Well into the nineteenth-century, that adverse 
reaction to the "climactic" French Revolution mottled the 
whole notion of an Enlightened Age with disrepute.  
Victorians adduced its once-vaunted humanitarian ambitions 
as the soil from which so many crimes against man had been 
harvested in the 1790s and thereafter.  Porter pointed to 
nineteenth-century conservatives who had seen it as far too 
extremist, whilst their radical foils found no antecedent 
inspiration in men like Voltaire, whom they disowned as 
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salon-bound chatterers rather than active 
revolutionaries.136 
 Though this marked aversion was self-conscious in 
Victorian Britain, Porter did not adjudge the Enlightenment 
and its values to have vanished indelibly from the 
intellectual or social life of Europe — especially in 
Britain.  "In the long term," he declared, "the 
Enlightenment ideology had got very deeply under the skin," 
citing the growth of British capitalism, liberalism, 
secularism, and even Owenite communitarianism as evidence 
of its internal effect.  "Might it have been," he 
continued, "the Enlightenment which rendered England proof 
against the French — and all subsequent — revolutions?"137 
 Porter would lament the inescapable fact that scholars 
such as Peter Gay or R.R. Palmer (or even Robert Darnton) 
had in his estimation missed, ignored, or excluded the 
profound British impact on Enlightenment — invariably in 
favour of France.  However, it was an historiographic 
tradition with deep roots: 
Such readings owe much to the assumption current 
ever since Edmund Burke and the Abbé Barruel that 
the Enlightenment's climax — or nadir — lay in 
what Palmer styled 'democratic revolution', 
enshrined first in the American and then in the 
French Revolutions.  The fact that there was no 
English revolt to match, indeed that John Bull 
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proved the bulwark of counter-revolution, seems 
to lend support to the idea that there can have 
been no English Enlightenment worthy of the 
name.138 
 
Ultimately, from the very beginning with Burke's account in 
1790, the mistakes had been those of historians.  To define 
both the ideals and the movement of Enlightenment merely by 
notoriety — as a simple, showy cocktail of atheism, 
materialism, and republicanism, and as a three-act thriller 
whose climactic chapter was blood-spattered revolution — 
was poor history.  It was a premise against which Roy 
Porter set himself for decades, not to simply deconstruct, 
but rather to draw a nuanced, life-like portrait inking 
myriad details of Enlightenment in all their eighteenth-
century intricacy. 
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PART III 
 
 Roy Porter's signal grievance with historians was 
their protracted ignorance and misrepresentation of the 
English Enlightenment.  The primary question springing from 
this was, then, from whence did such an historiographic 
black hole ever form, given that in its own day, reverence 
for British achievements had been widespread.  As it came 
to pass, his answers were ironic:  they lay within the 
nature of England's own intellectual circumstance.  It was 
a strange combination of misguided mythologization and a 
surprising conservatism set amidst the quirks of English 
history that had put its own Enlightenment at odds with 
later notions of what enlightenment meant, or at any rate, 
should have meant.  In the evolution of Porter's body of 
thought, those quirks entailed a peculiar set of 
characteristics, by turns moulding and distinguishing 
Britain's Age of Reason.  Practicality, individualism and 
amenability were its properties which came to the fore in 
his eclectic researches. 
 To Porter's mind, nearly all intellectual histories 
had consistently omitted the teeming ranks and 
contributions of justifiably renowned Britons of the 
eighteenth-century.  He protested: 
 70 
Abundant contemporary evidence thus proves the 
English parentage of so many of the continental 
children of light.  And yet modern scholarship 
reads like a paternity-denying alibi, proving 
that England's kinship with the family of 
philosophes was no closer than a maiden aunt's.  
This negative genealogy grew from the English 
Romantics' impatience with their predecessors' 
'single vision and Newton's sleep.'139 
 
If there had been a direct predecessor to Britain's 
Enlightened Age, Porter believed it was to have been found 
in the Dutch republic of the seventeenth-century.  But 
whereas he saw the Dutch movement as a somewhat evanescent 
product of oddball figures like Baruch Spinoza and refugees 
such as Pierre Bayle, England's rays of light had shone 
farther and longer.  Its perpetually vibrant society 
ensured that "unlike the Dutch, English thinkers remained a 
continuing influence on Europe."140 
 At its zenith, the idea of an Enlightened Britain was 
hardly unknown, and indeed was a veritable fixation for 
European intellectuals.  There was also a remarkable 
unanimity in the approbation afforded it: 
Anglomania swept the continent, fired by 
Voltaire's Lettres philosophiques (1733), which 
positively glowed about Britain's political 
liberty, religious toleration, economic success, 
cultural modernity and scientific glories – 
Newton above all.  English cultural innovations, 
notably periodicals, like the Spectator, and 
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novels, from Defoe's best-selling Robinson 
Crusoe, onwards, were widely imitated.  In exile 
in England, Voltaire had seen the future and it 
worked.141 
 
The philosophes' "idolatry" appeared ubiquitous in the 
eighteenth-century, and while France evidently felt 
England's shadow most strongly, Porter catalogued 
anglophiliac proclivities in Italy, Austria, and Germany 
(by way of Leibniz, conspicuously) as well.142 
 The consequence of this adulation was, Porter 
maintained, that the watermarks of English thinking found 
themselves stamped on the pages of European Aufklärung. 
Moral benevolism also flowed to the Continent 
from English sources, Locke and Shaftesbury, 
Addison and Steele.  Diderot's lifelong affair 
with virtù found tongue when he began to 
translate Shaftesbury. ... Nor was exporting less 
brisk in the natural sciences, where Newton's 
void space flooded into France through many 
channels in addition to Voltaire's enthusiastic 
evangelism.143 
 
Yet this also fated England's scientific contributions to 
be mischaracterized in myth, ultimately warped from their 
true state of historical development.  The premise of a 
scientific revolution exploding across the Channel in 
eighteenth-century Europe was somewhat disingenuous.  To be 
sure, tremendous advances had taken place in England by way 
of her Boyles and Newtons, but the conception of a sudden, 
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supernoval leap was originally the product of continental 
wish-fulfillment.  Britain's scientific and biological 
discoveries had been steady, not volcanic.  The 
philosophes, Porter believed, had been keen to present 
European science as a cataclysmic break from an older, 
ecclesiastically centered order. 
... it was Enlightenment propagandists for 
science from Fontenelle and the Encyclopédistes 
to Condorcet who first began to depict the 
transformations in astronomy and physics wrought 
by Copernicus, Newton and others as revolutionary 
breaks with the past, creating new eras in 
thought.144 
 
 At base, "true" enlightenment was increasingly 
associated with radical, bellicose shifts from archaic 
regimes – revolutions without the rubric.  ("Nuance," 
Porter wrote ruefully, implicitly and repeatedly, "is the 
key to Enlightenment in England.")145  Though continuous 
assault upon the keep of religious thinking was central to 
the age, he was bothered by many historians' neglect in 
identifying this as being yet another system of thinking. 
"The philosophes claimed that they had dynamited 
obsolete myths about man, and his place, under 
God, in nature, replacing them with true 
scientific knowledge, objectively grounded upon 
facts.  Many historians ... praise them for thus 
breaking with 'mythopoeic' thinking, and 
advancing 'from myth to reason'.  But it might be 
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better to say that what the philosophes 
essentially did was to replace a Christian myth 
with a scientific myth – one more appropriate for 
an age of technology and industrialization.146 
 
The British Enlightenment had in part fallen victim to the 
same failure of scholarship.  Like its constituent 
scientific progress, the movement's evolution and imprint 
had been arithmetic rather than logarithmic.  Porter noted, 
Admittedly, eighteenth-century England did not 
produce that galaxy of daring intellectuals, 
radiating all that was radical in politics, 
freethinking, and moral and sexual speculations, 
which flourished in France.  Yet this was not 
because England was benighted. ... It was because 
England was already undergoing, before the 
eighteenth-century opened, those transformations 
in politics, religion, and personal freedom for 
which French and other radicals had to clamour, 
unsuccessfully, all the century.147 
 
 Still, it was not lost on Porter that those same 
historical transformations had also conspired to cloud the 
country's legacy of Enlightenment.  England's basic 
religious toleration was an evident case.  Too many 
historians, as he saw it, had macerated the idea of 
enlightenment down to a strictly secularist – and therefore 
French – agenda.  English thinkers, on the other hand, had 
commonly attempted to articulate a type of "reasonable" 
Christianity within rationalist idioms: 
The simple fact is that Enlightenment goals – 
like criticism, sensibility or faith in progress 
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– throve in England within piety.  There was no 
need to overthrow religion itself, because there 
was no pope, no inquisition, no Jesuits, no 
monopolistic priesthood with a stranglehold on 
children through education and on families 
through confession.148 
 
The Enlightenment had been portrayed ceaselessly by critics 
and enthusiastics alike as a monolith, and one essentially 
French in practice, with Voltaire as its reigning bull-god.  
The cumulative effect left England's contributions 
lingering in the historiographic umbra: 
Obviously, if one's yardstick is France in mid 
century the English experience goes by default.  
But this hallucination need not detain us.  For 
most of the thinkers and benchmarks celebrated by 
the philosophes themselves long antedated the 
1740s:  the Declaration of Rights, the Toleration 
Act, the Act of Union, Locke, Newton, Defoe, 
Shaftesbury, Toland and the freethinkers.149 
 
Indeed, it was seventeenth-century England where the 
enlightenment first germinated and blossomed, due in great 
part to the Glorious Revolution and its guarantees of 
parliamentary government, religious toleration, and civil 
liberties.  It had also spawned a generation of 
philosophical luminaries of the calibre of John Locke who 
had in effect produced blueprints for the 
enlightened society:  a liberal regime based upon 
individual rights and natural law, the priority 
of society over government; a rational 
Christianity; the sanctity of property, to be 
deployed by owners within a liberal economic 
policy; a faith in education; and, not least, a 
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bold empiricist attitude towards the advancement 
of knowledge, which championed the human capacity 
to progress through experience.150 
 
 By Porter's reckoning, it was Locke, not Voltaire, who 
was the genuine sentinel of the Age of Reason; ("If 
Enlightenment had a father," his "paternity claim is better 
than any other").151  His philosophical bequest was also an 
English one.  Locke, Porter stressed, had managed to 
divorce man from Christian spirituality and moralism, re-
casting him as a child of his environment, whose ideas, 
aims, and works were the product of sensory experience.  He 
was now a protean creature, fit to master and modify the 
world.152 
 Yet for as bright a star as Locke had been in the 
intellectual firmament, his logical rigour was hardly 
representative of subsequent English thinkers.  They 
presented another historiographical obstacle in that they 
often avoided the path of formal systematic reasoning which 
frequently epitomized continental sages.  Porter held that 
this was a further reason for the short shrift historians' 
gave to English intellectuals: "Under this prejudice, 
seminal English influences, such as the brittle and 
allusive Shaftesbury, or Steele, have received little 
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scholarly attention."153  Indeed, he was inclined to think 
that the British were, after a fashion, intellectually 
averse to abstract pretense. 
Certainly, England produced no Critique of Pure 
Reason.  But why should systematic theorizing be 
the touchstone of enlightenment? ... In any case, 
the world of writer and audience in Georgian 
England had little stomach for synthetic 
philosophy.  No professoriate won kudos by 
scaling Andes of ideas.  The real intelligentsia 
was not chairbound but worked in the market 
place.  Ideas were a trade, produced for a wide 
popular readership.154 
 
This then, was a nucleus of the English Enlightenment 
around which so much else orbited.  The practicality of the 
nation's philosophy held true as much for its political and 
intellectual life during the eighteenth-century.  In 
Porter's estimation, the primary concern of British 
thinkers was not revolutionary or radical, but conservative 
in nature.  At the same time, it was strongly libertarian 
in bent, and was engrossed accordingly in the issue of how 
societies could function without the rigid discipline of an 
ancien régime. 
The grand problem facing English intellectuals in 
the Georgian century lay not in the need to 
criticize an old regime, or to design a new one 
at the drawing-board, but rather in defending 
their reformed polity and making it work.  It was 
a bold experiment.  Could a large measure of 
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individual liberty prove compatible with socio-
political stability?155 
 
 Such a milieu did not satisfy historians' criteria for 
Enlightenment values.  Though England had had its share of 
radicals, little or none of their philosophy came to actual 
fruition, in contrast to France.  With revolution as the 
byword, most English thinkers were eclipsed.  The Age of 
Reason was preferred to be "torch-bearer in the great relay 
of human progress," the task of which was to "smash the 
ancien régime and build the free world."  Porter observed 
sardonically: 
Hence, finding that English thinkers were not 
materialists, democrats, or anarchists we infer 
that eighteenth-century England was not 
enlightened.156 
 
To wave the flag for a political order of reasonableness 
put England in an unusual position as the eighteenth-
century unfolded.  The country's intellectuals were faced 
with protecting an experiment which had been largely 
successful – hardly a task for radical ideologues and hard-
bitten Jacobins. 
Enlightenment came early to the British Isles, 
and so its champions were exercised not only with 
having to create it but also then to defend it 
once achieved – theirs became a labour not just 
of criticizing and demolishing but of explaining, 
vindicating and extending ... The 'mission 
accomplished' mentality, however, certainly did 
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not preclude ongoing criticism and subversion, 
the problematizing of the progressive.157 
 
 If in England, as Porter put it, "the Enlightenment 
became established and the established became enlightened," 
many of the state's intellectual footsoldiers (with Whigs 
Burke and Gibbon at the vanguard) often taxed their 
cerebral brawn in defending the status quo against 
newfangled schemes for political "improvement".  The 
ideological order established in the wake of the Glorious 
Revolution had made England "both the most modern and 
(eventually) the most counter-revolutionary state in 
Europe."158  In like manner, conservatively-inclined 
thinkers were not hesitant to appropriate Newtonian 
cosmology in augmenting their case for the existing order, 
as it "afforded the perfect paradigm for a modern, stable, 
harmonious Christian polity ruled by law, not caprice."159 
 Unlike the intervallically antagonistic relationship 
between rulers and philosophers in France or Germany, 
Britain's Enlightenment was somewhat freer to blossom 
unmolested by higher powers.  Far less English ink was 
consequently dedicated to razor-edged screeds prescribing 
wholesale action against authorities.  Porter contended 
that this all had the egalitarian side-effect of convincing 
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many Englishmen that their system was not merely worth 
defending, but was integral to the quality of their lives.  
He stated, 
... in England, and England almost alone, the 
realization of Enlightenment hopes was not 
thwarted at every turn by the existing order of 
state and society.  Quite the reverse.  In 
England after 1688 the constitution itself 
incorporated central Enlightenment demands such 
as personal freedom under habeas corpus, 
representative government, religious toleration 
and the sanctity of property. ... the educated 
and propertied who espoused Enlightenment 
rationality did not need to storm barricades.  
For by application of intellect they could 
succeed within the rules of the game.160 
 
This was a defining characteristic that set England apart 
from France or other European cultures wading in the waters 
of enlightenment.  The British experience was borne along 
not merely by acerbic philosophers in salons, but by the 
upper professional classes:  entrepreneurs, administrators, 
clergy, jurists, and men of practical disciplines 
(exemplified by members of the Lunar Society).  These were 
the men Porter identified as the Enlightened who purchased, 
read, and digested the seminal works of the day, such as 
the Encyclopédie: 
Paradoxically, it was upon the patronage and 
purses of these pillars of the establishment – 
people at bottom socio-politically quite 
conservative, though often with an eager appetite 
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for intellectual novelty and fashionable culture 
– that the Enlightenment itself was sustained.161 
 
 It intrigued Porter that such figures – Josiah 
Wedgwood, Matthew Boulton, James Watt, Joseph Priestly, 
Erasmus Darwin — could be at once assiduous students of all 
the Enlightenment's innovative creeds of egalitarianism and 
progress, yet neither abstract intellectuals nor, 
necessarily, men of the people.  As manufacturers, doctors, 
or inventors, Britain's brightest lights had an interest in 
the practical things of the world, often standing at a 
distance from the salt of the earth.162  Porter's 
quintessential man of English reason was a case in point, 
Dr. Thomas Beddoes: 
Beddoes was not a systematic thinker. ... Though 
barely mentioned in standard histories of 
Aufklärung, he is, was, in every important 
respect, a central late-Enlightenment figure, an 
inveterate battler against ignorance, 
obscurantism, priestcraft, and oppression, both 
autocratic and aristocratic; lifelong he vested 
his faith in the powers of reason, science, and 
education to improve the human condition.163 
 
Despite Beddoes's eagerness to improve the common man's 
health, spirit and station, as Porter's biography of him 
adjudged, he remained frustrated by what he saw as plebian 
boorishness.  His medical practice and research bore him 
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out as a man of two minds, epitomizing much of the British 
Enlightenment's ambiguities. 
Beddoes had no doubts as to medicine's benign 
potential.  But an essential tension also clave 
his thought. ... For the fundamental relations of 
clinical medicine, Beddoes insisted, must hinge 
upon a hierarchy of expert authority (active 
physician, passive patient) based, not, of 
course, as then, on wealth, rank, patronage or 
pull, but on science and skill.  Two 
incommensurable images thus clashed in Beddoes's 
projections of a good society.  On the one hand, 
a heartfelt liberté and égalité.  On the other 
hand, the protocols of the technocrat.164 
 
So inasmuch as Beddoes's intellectual practicality was 
affixed on improving humanity's physical and social lot, 
Porter had identified him as being equally typical of many 
eighteenth-century thinkers (e.g., Burke or Voltaire) who 
did not entirely trust the rationality or good judgement of 
commoners in a truly democratic society.  He wrote: 
Classically, the tension implicit between 'for 
the people' and 'by the people' was to be 
resolved through the medium of education:  the 
wise pedagogue would help the people effect the 
transition from passive and grateful recipients 
of good to agencies of good in themselves. ... 
Yet, when [Beddoes] looked at the educated 
classes, could he really maintain his faith?165 
 
 Nevertheless, the middle class vigour as personified 
by individuals like Beddoes made England tremendously 
industrious in the eighteenth-century, manifest in an 
explosion of commercial and financial activity.  
                     
164
 Ibid., p. 191. 
165
 Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
 82 
Simultaneously, Britain's Enlightenment was fostered by the 
same men who were forming, with great alacrity, groups and 
societies of every sort for the express purpose of 
improving the world.  As the Church of England waned in 
Britain, Porter remarked that English intellectuals' 
practicality led to "joining", be it the Royal Society, the 
Society of Gardeners, the Spitalfields Mathematical 
Society, or any number of informal coffee house talking 
ensembles.166 
 Even so, the middle class movement was bursting with 
individualist fervour, and the nation's tumescent economy 
and corresponding increase in personal wealth raised some 
disquiet over the possible disintegration of England's 
civic cohesion.  Could the money, education, and growing 
power of the enlightened middle class generate side-effects 
both politically corrupting and socially divisive?  But in 
Porter's picture of eighteenth-century Britain, doom-laden 
soothsaying and rumours of inescapable revolution were 
hardly omnipresent.  Instead, he asserted, the central 
figure of the day was Adam Smith, whose response to the 
foreboding matter was ultimately optimistic and supported 
Britain's reigning economic philosophy.  Smith's systems of 
thinking 
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contended that the wealth of individuals would 
successfully enhance the wealth of nations, and 
that prosperity inevitably wove webs of 
interpersonal connections which strengthened, 
rather than divided, society.167 
 
 Moralists might have been bothered by the "possessive 
individualism" being wrought purportedly from the 
escalation of selfish financial pursuits, but Smith and his 
brethren retorted that British capitalism cultivated forces 
far more benevolent.  As Porter explained the proposition, 
Economic progress would produce a consumer 
society which would, in turn, serve to refine 
manners, promote peace, soften sensibilities, and 
bind men to their fellows by the invisible chains 
of commerce. ... Leading British intellectuals 
were thus more preoccupied with practicalities 
than with abstract programmes.168 
 
 Porter was inclined to think that British pragmatism 
lent itself to conflating economic freedom with personal 
liberties.  That said, he cautioned that Smith's counsel of 
fetterless economics did not express itself merely as 
prosperity's headlong rush into a self-indulgent 
consumerism.  "The Art of Living Well," as Porter termed 
it, was part of an Englishman's natural right, bound 
tightly to his sense of personal liberty in the pursuit of 
happiness.  Yet this too required amelioration by common 
sense: 
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A key dilemma faced articulate Englishmen.  How 
could one produce a society where individuals 
could pursue life, liberty, wealth and happiness, 
but which nevertheless possessed the stable 
solidarity needed to preclude self-destructive 
anarchy?  The English Enlightenment had certainly 
come riding in on the wavecrest of rampant 
assertions of rights.  Liberty and England become 
virtually synonymous. Lockean liberal 
individualist prescriptions assumed Biblical 
status for enlightened minds in all walks of 
life.169 
 
 It was not self-destruction though that occupied the 
highest column on the list of eighteenth-century English 
intellectual anxieties.  It was the possible effect it 
could have on the minds of commoners who might absorb that 
philosophy of self.  For if all men were to be equal in 
pursuit of wealth and recognition, what of the consequences 
of such social competition?  Or as Porter put it, 
The special quality of English Enlightenment 
social ethics lay in divining how to make the 
world safe for egoism:  how order could be 
sustained within an individualistic society.170 
 
The issue was dealing with "the boisterous and assertive 
plebian voice," whose pitch grew as the prosperity of 
middle class wealth trickled down, stoking the desire for a 
commensurate say in the country's institutions.  This 
quandary was met on two fronts.  The first remedy was to 
extend education and station as widely as possible: 
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The best bid for harmony was to assimilate as 
many people as possible within enlightened values 
– all who qualified themselves for admission by 
their industry, achieved rationality, civility or 
wealth.  Stability, not to be asserted through 
brute force, might be won through hegemony:  the 
universality of the law, mobility through merit 
and patronage ...171 
 
The other social tonic was (unlike in the ancien régime) a 
type of noble glasnost, whereby elites crossed paths with 
the rabble.  It might take the form of philanthropy, or 
business, or indeed literal contact: 
Foreigners observing the manners of the Quality 
were struck by their choosing to mingle with, 
rather than to segregate themselves from, the 
mob.  The hustings, sporting spectacles, 
theatres, resorts – all provided arenas of social 
mixing.172 
 
 The fact that "money became the Esperanto of social 
commerce" was to Porter a sign that burgeoning 
individualist capitalism essentially meant, for hoi polloi, 
bettering oneself.  Moreover, as the same desires appeared 
uniform regardless of who one was, it instilled a 
commonality which transversed social strata.  As with 
Beddoes the Enlightened Doctor, the whole of British 
society could accommodate a legion of sensibilities: 
Whereas militant French philosophes represented 
the world in contending opposites – light versus 
dark, body versus soul, humanity versus 
priestcraft ... English thought went for 
comprehension:  individual and society, trade and 
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gentility, conscience and self-love, science and 
religion, Locke's mental sensation and 
reflection, or even Priestley's monistic fusion 
of matter and spirit.173 
 
 While Porter argued that England's fresh and 
democratic avarice oiled the peaceful intercourse between 
most every sort of citizen (again, Voltaire's laudation of 
the Royal Stock Exchange comes to mind), the evolving 
social order also spawned a search for a new rational and 
moral accounting of oneself for oneself.  He suggested: 
Money [became] the new cult.  But in showing men 
content, and content to be content, it reveals a 
revolution in summum bonum, a shift from an ethic 
of righteousness which was transcendental and 
religious, to a selfhood which is psychological 
and personal. ... the Enlightenment translated 
the cosmic question, 'How can I be good?' into 
the pragmatic, 'How can I be happy?' and opened 
the gates for a new psychology of personal and 
social achievement.174 
 
This too, in practice, frequently meant 'joining' for the 
English, be it a Masonic lodge or scientific society;  
philosophically Porter summarized it as 
A rational art of ease, good humour, sympathy, 
restraint, moderation, sobriety and culture, 
based upon a knowledge of human nature – this was 
the key felicific technology pioneered by the 
English Enlightenment.175 
 
Of course, England's obsession with self-perception and 
commerce preordained some bizarre social consequences as 
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well.  The 'sick-trade' phenomenon of self-help therapies 
and a mania for personal well-being erupted across England 
amidst the Age of Reason — to the astonishment, 
incomprehension, and derision of many enlightened thinkers.  
It predicted a mad growth of self-love almost imperial in 
fortitude, and one that only metastasized as the century 
waned.  Porter mused, 
This 'coming-out' of the hypochondriac and 
hysteric constitutes an important symptom, the 
pathological downside of Enlightenment 
individualism.  Polite society encouraged 
cultural narcissism ...176 
 
Regardless, was this not, Porter wondered, yet another 
example of the utility of reason's fruit being extended 
ever so Britishly?  Indeed, there were no objects or 
disciplines sequestered from exploitation, or more acutely, 
from being rendered useful.  Proprietary rights to medical 
knowledge, holistic diets, or even the study of History all 
bowed inexorably in the court of practicality. 
 In scrutinizing the latter field, Porter dedicated 
another biography, proffering Edward Gibbon, like Beddoes, 
as an archetype of the enlightened Englishman.  History, as 
it obtained from reason's application, had to be useful to 
the citizen, decreed Gibbon.  It was the finest tool which 
could ratchet loose the political questions bedeviling 
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eighteenth-century Britain; Were governments above the law?  
Were laws and constitutions forever begotten from kings?  
"For Gibbon," Porter wrote, "history was worthless unless 
it constituted a school of virtue; it must be 
instructive."177 
 This English sense of all-encompassing utility was not 
lost on foreigners, particularly in Britons' application by 
deed rather than high-sounding notion.  This could manifest 
itself by a citizen's charitable works, agricultural 
advancements in the fields, science in service of industry, 
or, to Porter's palpable glee, the novel invention of 
roasting buttered bread to create toast.  He opined, 
... the Enlightenment in England is marked by 
pragmatism.  The proof of the pudding time lay in 
the eating.  'No vain utopia' seated somewhere 
over the rainbow, the acid test of the 
Enlightenment lay in the skill with which the 
garden was actually cultivated, or rather the 
fields enclosed, the buttons burnished and hopes 
realized. Foreign visitors marvelled at the 
business, practicality, and resourcefulness of 
England's thriving hive. ... Obversely, 
Enlightened Englishmen felt contempt for 
continental incompetence.178 
 
 Much of Porter's purpose in his histories of Britain's 
Age of Reason (and not the least in his biographies of 
Beddoes and Gibbon) was to highlight this practicality in 
the most vivid, yet no-nonsense form.  Philosophical men 
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who were more than mere philosophers, the picture he 
sketched of them was intended to mirror the heterogeneous 
facets of the eighteenth-century.  His canon of works was 
therefore a necessary pestle in History's mortar; the 
English, he revealed innovatively, were indeed enlightened, 
enlightened first, and enlightened longest.  But as a 
consequence, surprisingly conservative in nature. 
 Porter had knowingly drawn an intellectual genealogy 
placing Georgian Englishmen as children of their Lockean 
and Baconian forefathers, each toiling away in separate 
corners of the same room, setting themselves distinct 
tasks, but manipulating a uniform heritage in their 
execution.  Some furthered the cause of reform and 
innovation in economics or science or political 
restructuring, others sought to export the benefits of 
Britain's enlightened system beyond her borders as a type 
of ethical cross to be borne, whilst others (Edmund Burke 
most dramatically) laboured to prevent recidivism 
imperiling the foundations of political order. 
 It was also remarkable that Porter painted such an 
unpredictably optimistic picture of England's eighteenth-
century.  He uncovered an era in which enlightenment led 
not to unrelenting radicalism or violence or subcutaneous 
self-loathing, but rather to an honest and circumspect 
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desire on the part of Englishmen to understand and improve 
themselves, nature, and society.  He may well have been 
right.  For the Enlightenment — and especially in England — 
he maintained, remained a bloom half-unfolded, still 
awaiting the full light of scholarship: 
... the history of the English intelligentsia, in 
the transition from Enlightenment to Romanticism, 
still remains to be written.  Historians of 
political thought have given us meticulous 
accounts of Burke and Paine, of Bentham and the 
rise of Utilitarianism ... But we are still far 
from fully understanding the place and self-
perception of intellectuals, such as Beddoes, in 
respect to the opportunities and threats posed by 
industrialization, by the growth of a commercial, 
consumer society, by wealth, luxury and its 
discontents.179 
 
At turns, Porter himself seemed astonished by the 
extraordinary success of British reasonableness, and 
exulted in the telling.  There was more sanguinity to be 
found in the even-handed advance of England's Age of Reason 
than there was dystopian chaos or failure.  Little wonder 
then, at his regret and delight in having being its first 
advocate. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 There is, admittedly, a somewhat recursive nature to 
the propositions set forth in the preceding chapters, 
inasmuch as Edmund Burke convincingly denounced radical 
philosophy on behalf of the British Enlightenment, while 
historians, following in his wake, pronounced radical 
philosophy to be Enlightenment, and marginalized his place 
within it.  Roy Porter was the first to reveal this, and in 
doing so, argued that the British Enlightenment was the 
overlooked Northern Star in the Age of Reason's sky. 
 According to Porter, Burke and his line of reckoning 
were thoroughly representative of Britain's own 
idiosyncratic Enlightenment.  It was conservative in its 
aims, and self-defensive on account of its previous 
success.  Ideas which had once been radical had, in Burke's 
mind, long since served a superior and effective socio-
political order.  Moreover, he maintained, tradition had 
been their sustaining buttress. 
 The Continental systems of thinking, with their 
emphasis on absolute rights, anti-ecclesiasticism, and 
republicanism, were generally eschewed by many of the 
pragmatically-minded British intellectuals.  More to the 
point, such French philosophy was inevitably tarnished when 
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Burke claimed it had been guilty of forging the 1789 
Revolution's futile bloodshed.  In acknowledging this, 
Porter identified Burke as the progenitor of all 
vituperation which connoted anything perceived as radical 
French sophistry as having a capacity to incite disorder.  
Yet if violent revolution and French prescriptions for 
social engineering came to be historians' stock reference 
for the Enlightenment, the ironic consequence was that 
Burke and his utility-minded contemporaries fell into 
shadows as counter-revolutionaries marching the ramparts on 
watch against Aufklärung.  In short, men like Burke (or 
Gibbon or Adam Smith) were barely worthy of inclusion 
amongst the Enlightenment's key thinkers.  Porter was the 
first to take serious issue with this state of historical 
affairs and dedicate his scholarly energies to remedying 
the intellectual record. 
 The heart of Burke's case was not that revolution in 
itself was absolutely wrong, but rather that it required 
legitimacy and grounds for action.  The French, as he saw 
it, were entranced by a set of intrinsic and rigid 
economic, human, and political rights, and proclaimed 
violent upheaval as a universally scouring bromide.  
England's previous revolutions, however, were of a 
different species, legitimate because they were conceived 
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and executed under the auspices of a long-established 
parliament, and because monarchs had deviated from their 
own long-established obligations to their subjects.  For 
that reason, those Britons who lauded the anarchic French 
revolutionaries, and who encouraged their ideas in London, 
were unquestionably dangerous.  It was the duty of 
Englishmen to protect their tried and refined freedoms and 
order against such radicalism. 
 Porter, though, came to believe Burke and his 
successors had misplaced their focus on the philosophes, 
whose true bequest to the European mind was not the French 
or any other revolution but in fact the acclimatization of 
secularism to private and public life.  Just as 
importantly, he suggested that Burke had initiated the 
historical tradition of viewing the French Revolution as 
the self-fulfilling climax of eighteenth-century 
enlightened philosophy.  Directly, a generation of English 
intellectuals had turned on the Enlightenment, framing it 
for their Victorian descendants as quizzical at best, 
malevolent at its vilest. 
 In truth, Porter had noted that in its homeland 
English radicalism had little fertile soil in which it 
could germinate.  Moreover, Burke's steely articulation had 
godfathered a virtual bonfire of reactionary style, and the 
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bathetic accounts of the Terror provided substantial fuel 
for the flames of a Romantic backlash.  The ideas from the 
Age of Reason were, Porter lamented, then set to be 
tarnished historiographically on account of these factors.  
Paradoxically, along with it went any notions of a British 
Enlightenment, for only truly radical thinkers were 
enlightened. 
 In the face of this, Porter decreed that it was the 
English who were the strongest parents (and most envied 
scions) of the Culture of Light.  John Locke, he contended, 
had been its first great torch-bearer in the seventeenth-
century, and following after, Britain had become the 
freest, most liberal, and most vigorous of European 
societies, established as the template for Continental 
aspirants. 
 This benevolent inheritance thus nurtured generations 
of intellectuals who found themselves in an ostensibly 
atavistic position.  Porter described them as attempting 
consequently to protect the status quo from radical 
challenges which were imported from dissenters living under 
rather more illiberal regimes. 
 He also maintained that from the beginning it was in 
the cultural baggage of English thinkers to favour 
practical enterprises — as evinced by Edmund Burke — rather 
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than more speculative pursuits.  As the major work of 
reforming the state's governing institutions had been dealt 
with by their antecedents, British sages could tend to 
other — more functional — matters, such as assimilating the 
lower classes into greater spheres of public and 
intellectual life, or making better toast. 
 For Porter, these individuals were as worthy as (or 
indeed worthier than) the Voltaires and d'Alemberts to take 
center stage in eighteenth-century histories.  To dismiss 
their conservatism as counter-revolutionary was to ignore 
that they were simply a different type of thinker, more 
likely to be a middle-class professional than a denizen of 
a salon.  In point of fact, Porter reasoned, the 
Continentals had failed because they focused on revolution 
or wholesale social transformation, whilst England's 
enlightened succeeded because their interests lay in 
commerce, reform, and the improvement of all things useful. 
 Indeed, a defining characteristic of Porter's British 
Enlightenment was to deny that intellectual life was 
strictly the cerebral legerdemain of some scholarly elite.  
The accounting and mastering of the natural world by 
reason's tools provided an entreé into the sphere of ideas 
for down-to-earth men, no less intellectual, be they 
inventors, entrepreneurs, economists, or engineers.  Like 
 96 
the philosophes, they may have postulated how nature fit 
into a newly-ordered relationship with humanity, but in 
Britain it was typically men of property who transformed 
society by putting that knowledge to use. 
 Despite this, Porter remained at heart an historian of 
ideas, and was less interested in agrarians' views on 
English pastoralism than in how they eventually altered a 
larger ideological conception of the world.  As fellow 
historian of ideas Simon Schaffer opined, "On this showing, 
Roy's work surely seems more fascinated by coffee houses 
than by country estates and by pamphleteers than 
ploughmen."180 
 If anything, one of Porter's most vehement goals was 
to in some measure rehabilitate the Enlightenment from two 
centuries' naysayers.  He reproached nineteenth-century 
scholarship which cavalierly dismissed the Age of Reason in 
such a manner: 
Sometimes silly, often seductive, but always 
shallow, Enlightenment teachings had proved 
appallingly dangerous. Its much-vaunted 
humanitarianism had led (so many Victorians 
accused) to the crimes against humanity committed 
in the French Revolution and thereafter.  
Unsympathetic critics, nowadays postmodernist as 
well as conservative, still make similar 
insinuations.181 
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 Porter was sedulous in assembling an affirmative case 
for the era and many of its figures, though this aspect of 
his scholarship was occasionally criticized as much as it 
was lauded.  Friend and erstwhile collaborator Jan Golinski 
confirmed Porter's status as a headstrong proponent of the 
Enlightenment's positive legacy.  He wrote: 
Though he recognized some of the less welcome 
consequences of the Enlightenment, he tended to 
downplay them, mentioning them in passing without 
allowing them to modify his basically optimistic 
view.182 
 
 Golinski furthermore took Porter to task for 
sometimes, despite his eclectic researches, failing to 
discuss the myriad mutations of religious life in 
seventeenth-century Britain.  It was certainly strange, he 
noted, and perhaps unforgivable, for an historian of such 
scope to not attend figures like John Wesley or David 
Hartley, or to give Joseph Priestley's theology due time 
(despite having authored a biography on him). 
 Nevertheless, Golinski remarked that as a rule Porter 
was singled out from amongst his peers by his cosmically 
vast bibliographies, wherein are to be found "doggerel 
verse and pamphlet prose" side by side with the traditional 
intellectual giants.  Indeed, he suggested that Porter held 
many noted historians (Peter Gay and Ernst Cassirer not the 
                     
182
 Jan Golinski, "A Legacy of Enlightenment", British Journal for the 
History of Science, 41 (2003), p. 347. 
 98 
least) as wanting, due to their fixations on the small 
tesserae of the Enlightenment.183  Finally, Golinski has 
noted that for all Porter's span of ideas, his umbilical 
ties to London meant he was rarely conscious of Britain's 
regional and provincial sensibilities — something Dublin 
born and raised Burke would have undoubtedly grasped:  "The 
way in which being Irish or Scottish can be central to the 
self-awareness of thinkers from those nations was something 
Roy never felt."184 
 Even so, Burke and Porter were consilient at points, 
being types of philosophes in their own respective idioms.  
Their thoughts bear out an assessment of and an affection 
for an England laudable for its eminent utility.  To Burke, 
the general reasonableness of his country's intellectual 
attitudes was a preservative and safeguard. But to Porter 
it was a tool wielded in service of political, physical, 
and social benefit;  the world was infinitely better, he 
believed, for the stability and curiosity of the British. 
 Yet the fact that Porter identified such profundity 
(often justifiably so) in practical men and their works is 
ironic, for he and his histories luxuriate in the jumbled 
incongruities in which the Enlightenment and the 
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Enlightened commonly entangled themselves.  In memoriam 
Simon Schaffer mused: 
At the heart of enlightened attitudes towards 
nature lay a nest of paradoxes, [Porter] 
declared, tensions between improvement and 
primitivism, between exploitation and 
conservation.185 
 
Edmund Burke wrote his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France anxiously, lest he next deliver a threnody for his 
society.  Roy Porter, in full confidence, could declare 
such works to be the true acts of the modern world's 
creation. 
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